




HEI Working Paper No: 18/2007 
 
Preference Erosion: 
The case of Bangladesh 
A SUR-EC-AR Gravity Model of Trade 
 
Erika Vianna Grossrieder 




This  paper  analyses  the  impact  of  preference  erosion  on  Bangladesh’s  clothing 
industry coming from both the ATC quotas phasing-out and the reduction on MFN 
tariffs under NAMA negotiations. First, it undertakes a numerical exercise to estimate 
the  effects  of  tariffs  reduction  in  the  US  and  the  EU  on  Bangladesh’s  economic 
performance.  Then  it  uses  a  SUR-EC-AR  gravity  model  of  trade  to  measure  the 
effects of ATC quotas phasing out and NAMA negotiations on trade pattern. The 
results  suggest  that  Bangladesh  gains  from  importing  countries’  tariffs  reduction, 
independently  of  ATC  implementation.  Despite  the  fact  that  these  results  may 
underestimate the effects of quotas phasing out on T&C trade pattern, the model’s 
structure presents the advantage of eliminating the aggregation bias problem. It would 
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Preference Erosion: The case of Bangladesh 
 
I.  Introduction 
Until 1994, textiles and wearing apparel was the “only major manufacturing industry 
not subject to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), being 
the subject of an extensive use of quotas by the major importing countries”
1. Textiles 
and Clothing (T&C) are highly protected goods, presenting “tariff peaks, high tariffs, 
and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers”
2. Thus, countries with preferential 
access to restricted markets enjoy an increase on its relative competitiveness, granting 
them a market share they would not have under freer trade. 
T&C industry is believed to be an “opportunity for the industrialization of developing 
countries
3  (DC)  in  low  value  added  goods”
4,  and  many  least  developed  countries 
(LDC) have programs for industrial development based on T&C production. There 
are many reasons for this: First of all, T&C is labor-intensive, and requires a large 
amount of unskilled workers
5. Secondly, because the quota system imposed on T&C, 
any country can have a market share in the quota-imposing countries, independently 
of its competitiveness. Finally, part of the T&C exports from LDC is covered by 
unilateral preferences.  
At the end of the Uruguay Round it was agreed by a voluntary commitment
6, known 
as “Textiles and Clothing Agreement” (ATC), to phase out quotas “gradually over a 
ten years period, with the last quotas being lifted 1
st January 2005”
7. But in 2005, the 
US and the EU used the safeguard clause in order to keep quota restriction on China 
until 2008. The total elimination of quotas will alter the competitiveness of various 
exporting  countries,  and  those  that  have  been  less  restricted  by  the  quotas  are 
                                                 
1 Ernst & al (2005), page 1.  
2 WTO homepage, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
3 In this paper, the group of developing countries (DC) includes also least developing countries (LDC).  
4 Ernst & al (2005), preface. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 WTO homepage, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
7 Ernst & al (2005), page 1.  
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expected to lose market share to their competitors
8. The change in market share will 
depend on factors as the degree of quota restrictiveness, the dependency on restricted 
markets, economic governance, and competitiveness in the T&C sector. 
During the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Ministerial Conference
9, the 
ministers agreed to start the negotiations on tariffs reductions for all non-agricultural 
products.  The  Non-Agricultural  Market  Access  (NAMA)  aims  “to  reduce,  or  as 
appropriate, eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, 
high  tariffs,  and  tariff  escalation,  as  well  as  non-tariff  barriers,  in  particular  on 
products of export interest to developing countries”
10. These negotiations should take 
place from January 2002 to 2006, but will probably last until 2008. During the WTO 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference
11, a non-linear formula (Swiss type formula) was 
chosen in order to reduce tariffs, especially in sectors presenting tariff peaks. Because 
textiles and wearing apparel are highly protected goods, its “tariffs are particularly 
likely to be subject to deeper cuts under the current negotiations
12.”  
Many DC have preferential access to restricted markets
13. Preference erosion refers to 
a relative decline on market access due to elimination of preferences, reduction on 
barriers to trade, or an increase in competitors’ preferential access. 
LDC  receiving  unilateral  preferences  on  T&C  may  face  losses  coming  from  two 
sources: at one hand, a reduction in tariffs under NAMA negotiation may represent 
lesser income, coming from both fall of tariffs revenues for importing entering these 
countries and preference erosion. On the other hand, since many LDC receive also 
quota free access to restricted markets, the quota phasing-out may represent loss of 
market share by exposing LDC’ exports to more competitive producers.  
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world. Being a LDC, Bangladesh’s 
economy  is  characterized  by  low  income,  weak  human  assets,  and  economic 
                                                 
8 Yang & Mlachila (2006), page 3. 
9 The Doha Ministerial Conference launched the Doha Development Agenda, also known as Doha 
Round.  The  conference  was  held  in  November  2001,  at  Doha,  Qatar.  WTO  homepage  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm 
10 WTO homepage, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
11  The  Hong  Kong  Ministerial  Conference  was  held  in  December  2005,  in  Hong  Kong.  WTO 
homepage at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm 
12 Rahman & Shadat (2006), page 9. 
13 This paper does not aim to analyse the impact of unilateral preferences on trade, only the erosion on 




14. During the early 1990’s, Bangladesh started an  ambitious plan for 
trade  liberalization  and  economic  stabilization.  Trade  liberalization  measures 
implemented included reduction on import tariffs, and elimination of quotas and other 
non-tariff  barriers.  In  order  to  encourage  foreign  direct  investment  and  promote 
exports, two export processing zones (EPZ) were created
15. As a result, Bangladesh’s 
average annual real GDP growth in the 1990s was about 4.8 per cent
16.  
At  the  present,  Bangladesh  international  trade  is  largely  dominated  by  wearing 
apparel,  representing  about  72  per  cent  of  its  exports  in  2004.  Also,  as  a  LDC, 
Bangladesh relies on preferential schemas for its exports. Bangladesh’s exports on 
clothing receive unilateral preferences from the EU (duty-free and quota-free access), 
but not from the US. A reduction on the most favored nation (MFN) tariffs worldwide 
would reduce Bangladesh preference margins in the EU, although it would increase its 
relative competitiveness in the US market. On the other hand, the elimination of T&C 
quotas  in  the  US  and  the  EU  may  cause  “significant  pressure  on  its  balance  of 
payment, output and employment”
17. 
This  paper  analyses  the  impact  of  preference  erosion  on  Bangladesh’s  clothing 
industry coming from both the ATC quotas phasing-out and the reduction on MFN 
tariffs under NAMA negotiations. It is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the 
literature on preference erosion. Section 3 presents an overview of T&C international 
trade pattern. Section 4 evaluates Bangladesh competitiveness in the apparel sector. 
Section 5 undertakes a numerical exercise to estimate the effects of tariffs reduction in 
the US and the EU on Bangladesh’s economic performance. Section 6 uses a gravity 
model to measure the effects of ATC quotas phasing and NAMA negotiations on 
trade pattern. Section 7 presents the conclusion.  
 
                                                 
14 A country is qualified to be a LDC if it presents low income (under $750), weak human assets (based 
on indicators of nutrition, health, school enrolment and adult literacy), and economic vulnerability 
(based  on  instability  of  agricultural  production,  instability  of  exports  of  goods  and  services, 
diversification form traditional economic activities, merchandise export concentration, and economic 
smallness.).  UNCTAD  Statistical  Profiles  of  the  Least  Developed  Countries  2005  at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldcmisc20053_en.pdf 
15 Rahman, N (2005), pages 107 to 110, presents the main reforms and liberalization policies lead by 
Bangladesh since independency.  
16 United Nations Statistic Division. 
17 Yang & Mlachila (2006), Abstract.  
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II.   Preference Erosion: Literature Overview 
 
1.  Preference Erosion’s Framework 
Preferences are granted with the objective to increase the industrialization in DC, to 
accelerate their rate of economic growth, as well as to increase their export earnings.
18 
The idea behind preferences is to increase the relative competitiveness of beneficiary 
countries with respect to non-beneficiary countries
19. In many cases preferences may 
create  “preference-dependent”
20  producers.  Decrease  in  protection,  such  as  quota 
abolition  or  tariff  reduction,  may  enhance  market  access  for  more  competitive 
suppliers, bringing changes in relative prices, supply patterns and export revenues.
21  
Preferential programs cover a number of goods that may receive preferential access 
under certain conditions. Once these conditions are fulfilled, a preference-receiving 
country can use the preferential channel. The rules of origin (RoO) determine that 
only goods “substantially transformed” within a country can receive preferences
22. 
Substantial transformation requires the exported goods and its inputs to belong to 
different tariffs classifications. Sometimes it fixes a ceiling for imported inputs, or 
else prohibits the use of certain inputs
23. RoO can be viewed as a means to avoid the 
trade  diversion  that  occurs  when  countries  without  preferences  export  through 
countries with preferential access
24. In practice they work as a “powerful protectionist 
tool”
25 by imposing high compliance costs due to administrative burden, in addition to 
the requirement that inputs are sourced from higher costs suppliers
26.  
Many studies suggest that stringent RoO may cause low utilization rate. Utilization 
rate refers to the ratio between exports going through the preferential channel and the 
                                                 
18 Inama (2005), page1. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Expression used by The Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). 
21 Commonwealth Secretariat (2004), page 16. 
22 Inama (2005), page 1. 
23 Cadot et al (2005), pages 7 and 8, gives a good overview on RoO criteria.  
24 Inama (2005), pages 1 and 2. 
25 Cadot et al (2005), page 3. 
26 Low et al (2005), page 7.  
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exports  covered  by  the  preferential  program
27.  Hence  the  scope  of  a  preferential 
program will depend on the preference receiving country’s utilization rate.  
“Preference  erosion  refers  to  declines  in  the  competitive  advantage  that  some 
exporters enjoy in foreign markets as a result of preferential trade treatment—both 
unilateral and reciprocal. Preference erosion can occur when export partners eliminate 
preferences,  expand  the  number  of  preference  beneficiaries,  or  lower  their  most-
favored-nation (MFN) tariff without lowering preferential tariffs proportionately.”
28  
2.  Literature Overview 
Due to the actuality of NAMA negotiations and the imminent quotas’ abolition on 
T&C sector, the literature about preference erosion is fast increasing and attracting the 
interest of many researchers
29. Because the effects of quotas and tariffs on prices are 
different, studies on erosion of preference can be separated between those analyzing 
the  effects  of  tariffs  changes,  and  those  estimating  the  consequences  of  quotas 
elimination.  Only  a  few  studies  analyze  tariffs  reduction  and  quotas  elimination 
simultaneously. 
While most of the literature refers to general studies, three papers study specifically 
the case of Bangladesh. Rahman & Shadat (2006) estimate the preference erosion 
for Bangladesh and other Asian LDC under different NAMA scenarios by comparing 
the changes due to tariff reduction in duty paid in the US with the decline on the 
preference margin enjoyed in the EU. They found that Bangladesh will lose between 
24.3 million to 53 million US$, depending on the scenario simulated. Because they do 
not account for the preference utilization rates, their results may overstate Bangladesh 
losses. 
Yang  &  Mlachila  (2004)  evaluate the  effects  on Bangladesh’s economy of ATC 
quotas phasing out. They point out that the productivity of the Bangladeshi apparel 
industry is low mostly because the government restricted foreign investment in the 
RMG sector to keep the large quota rents for domestic producers. By using the Global 
                                                 
27 According to Inama (2005), page 5, product coverage is “the ratio between imports that are covered 
by a preferential trade arrangement and total dutiable imports from the beneficiaries’ countries”; and 
utilization rate is “the ratio between imports actually receiving preferences and covered imports”.  
28 Alexandraki & Landes (2004), page 5. 
29 Lipholdt & Kowalski (2005) present an excellent literature overview on preference erosion.  
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Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) global general equilibrium model, they found that the 
reduction on Bangladeshi total exports amounts to 6.8% to 29.5% (depending on the 
substitution  elasticity  used  in  the  simulations).  Based  on  the  evaluation  of  quota 
restrictiveness, export similarity across countries, and supply constraints, they found 
that Bangladesh might face significant pressures on its balance of payments, output 
and employment. 
Lips et al (2003) analyze the impact on the Bangladesh economy of both the quotas 
phasing-out and the reduction on MFN tariffs worldwide. Because Bangladesh has 
quota free access in the EU, liberalization may reduce its relative competitiveness. By 
using the GTAP general equilibrium model, they found that Bangladesh would face 
welfare losses from both tariff reduction and the elimination of quotas. 
Among  general  studies,  Low  et  al  (2005)  analyze  the  risk  of  preference  erosion 
arising from MFN tariffs reduction for countries receiving non-reciprocal preferences 
in the US, the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia. They believe the risk of preference 
erosion to be overstated. By considering the effect of less-than-full-utilization, they 
find that on average DC do not lose from preference erosion, and that almost all LDC 
either lose or are unaffected by it. In a similar study, Amiti & Romalis (2006) review 
the effects of tariffs reduction on market access for DC. They show that preferential 
access is less generous than it appears because the product coverage is low and the 
rules of origin are complex. Hence, the gains on market access would offset the losses 
from preference erosion. 
Córdoba & Vanzetti (2004) analyze the economic impact of proposals in the non-
agricultural market access negotiations in the WTO using a GTAP global general 
equilibrium  model.  The  authors  find  that  losses  from  tariff  revenue  could  have  a 
strong negative impact on the government revenue in a number of countries. Still, 
changes in output may be moderate, suggesting small structural adjustment costs. 
For many countries preference erosion may not be a serious concern because the low 
utilization rates of preferential access. In many studies, stringent RoO are considered 
to  be  the  main  cause  of  low  utilization  rate.  Cadot  et  al  (2005)  find  a  negative 
correlation between utilization rates and costs associated to RoO. By constructing a 
synthetic index intended to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin in preferential  
 
  10
trade agreements they find that RoO do discourage the use of preferences. Inama 
(2005) uses the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), from World Bank and finds 
that “the missing trade preferences” for textiles and clothing due to strict RoO is at the 
order of 1 billion US$.  
According  to  The  Commonwealth  Secretariat’s  study  (August  2004),  many 
preference-dependent economies will have problems to adjust to a more liberalized 
trading  environment.  The  authors  analyzed  the  ATC  quotas  elimination  by  using 
quota rents as a measure for preferences, finding two sources of losses to preference-
dependent economies: the losses in quota rents, and the losses in export revenues due 
to  the  lack  of  relative  supply  responsiveness.  Because  countries  getting  quota 
preferential  access  to  highly  protected  markets  receive  a  price  premium  over  the 
normal  rate  of  return,  there  is  an  incentive  to  allocate  resources  to  that  sector, 
independently  of  competitiveness.  Hence  under  preferential  access  some  countries 
may  develop  sectors  that  would  not  subsist  under  a  more  free  trade.  Once  the 
preferences removed, these countries will suffer a loss in income transfer, which will 
reduce the investment incentives for that country or sector. 
Alexandraki & Lankes (2004) try to identify middle-income developing countries 
that are potentially vulnerable to export losses coming from preference erosion. They 
conclude that countries relying deeply on preferential access to the QUAD markets, 
with a small export base and presenting a high share of its exports to high restrict 
markets, are likely to be vulnerable to the preference erosion.   
Lipholdt & Kowalski (2005) use the GTAP standard model and database to simulate 
trade liberalization scenarios that would entail preference erosion. While highlighting 
a number of cases of preference reliance, the paper underscores the advantages of 
multilateral  liberalization.  Globally,  and  for  a  majority  of  developing  regions, 
liberalization by preference-granting countries will result in positive welfare gains, 
notwithstanding the effects of preference erosion. In a comparatively small number of 
cases though, the analysis points to a risk of net welfare losses. 
Ernst et al (2005) uses a gravity model to estimate the implication of the end of the 
MFA on trade and employment. They develop a quota impact indicator that takes into 
account the expected change on quota restrictiveness. By including this variable, as  
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well  as  tariffs,  in  a  gravity  model  they  found  that  only  three  countries,  namely 
Pakistan,  China  and  Hong Kong,  would  experiment  a  significant  increase in  total 
exports. Bangladeshi exports would decrease about 21 percent, representing a loss of 
about 220 thousand jobs.  
Conversely, Mayer (2004) considers that  the  rise in  China’s  market  share due  to 
quotas phasing out is likely to be lower than often suggested by the literature because 
the  T&C  industry  structure  and  the  sourcing  strategies  of  buyers,  and  the  current 
patterns of tariff protection and preferential schemes. In addition, the author considers 
that  most  of  studies  do  not  account  for  China’s  development  objectives  requiring 
structural  changes  towards  production  and  exports  of  manufactures  that  are  more 
skill-intensive than the clothing industry. 
 
 
This  paper  analyzes  the  effects  of  preference  erosion  due  to  tariffs  reduction  and 
quotas elimination on the Bangladeshi economy. It uses a system gravity model of 
trade to find that, under constant demand, Bangladesh’s decline on apparel exports 
from quota  phasing-out amounts to 0.98 to 2.46 percent. Conversely there are no 
losses  from  preference  erosion  due  to  tariffs  reduction:  Bangladesh’s  gains  from 
NAMA  negotiations  are  between  195  and  661  million  US$.  These  results  may 
underestimate the overall losses from quota removal, and differ from the common 
literature  on  this  subject.  However,  the  model  used  presents  the  advantage  of 
eliminating the aggregation bias. The inclusion of textiles products and more trade 





III.  International Trade on T&C 
1.  Overview 
T&C  trade  structure  is  highly  distorted  by  tariffs,  quotas  and  preferential  access, 
which affect exporters’ relative competitiveness, international prices and trade pattern. 
Historically  considered  by  industrial  countries  as  a  sensitive  sector,  textiles  and 
wearing  apparel  were  not  part  of  the  GATT  until  1994
30.  The  Uruguay  Round 
launched the negotiations to phase out barriers to trade through the inclusion of T&C 
in  the  WTO  framework
31  resulting  in  the  1994  ATC  quotas  phasing-out.  The 
liberalization  sector  was  pushed  further  in  the  Doha  Round  with  the  overture  of 
NAMA negotiations
32. While both work towards complete trade liberalization, they 
are independent from each other. 
The elimination of quotas and reduction on tariffs may reduce consumer’s prices and 
increase  the  volume  of  trade,  reducing  market  distortions.  On  the  other hand,  the 
reduction in barriers to trade will reduce the scope of preferential access causing an 
erosion of actual preferences enjoyed by many DC.  
2.  The Tariffs Structure 
Tariffs are taxes imposed on imports value. Tariffs increase prices of imported goods 
in the home market, enhancing the relative competitiveness of domestic producers. 
Tariffs are an important trade policy’s instrument that can be used to many purposes, 
such as to protect a new sector or a key industry in the economy
 33. The average tariff 
levels, as well as the dispersion rates across products, both influence consumers and 
producers decisions, affecting the overall trade structure
34.  
The sensitive goods’ tariff structure in developed countries is characterized by high 
tariffs,  tariffs  escalation  and  tariff  peaks.  The  average  tariff  rate  on  textiles  and 
apparel are from two to four times the average tariff level on manufactured goods 
                                                 
30 Ernst & al (2005), page 1. 
31 Quantitative restrictions are not allowed in the WTO framework. 
32 Understanding the WTO, at WTO homepage, at http://www.wto.org/. 
33 The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, seventh edition, page 375. 
34 WTO (2004), page 8.  
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taken as a group
35. Table 3.2.1 compares the applied tariffs for industrial and T&C 
goods in the US and EU. It also presents the percentage of tariff peaks on total tariff 
lines.  
Table 3.2.1: Structure of applied tariffs in the US and the EU, simple average, in 
percentage, in 2002. 
 
Applied tariffs, in percent 
 
US  EU 
Industrial products  4.2  3.7 
T&C MFN  9.7  8.0 
T&C GSP  9.4  7.2 
T&C LDC   9.4  0.0 
International peaks*  6.3  8.6 
Domestic peaks*  5.3  5.8 
*  % Of all tariff lines      Source: WTO (2004), pages 5 and 15. 
 
Tariff escalation occurs when the tariff rate increases with the level of transformation 
of  a  good.  Mild  nominal  tariff  escalation  provides  high  effective  protection  by 
affecting the entire structure of tariffs (raw materials, intermediated goods and final 
products)
36. Tariff escalation causes a misallocation of resources in both importing 
and exporting countries. In the importing country, it affects negatively the domestic 
production of primary goods by allowing imported raw materials to enter the market 
at low prices. By imposing low tariffs on raw materials and high tariffs in processed 
goods,  developed  countries  encourage  downstream  processing  in  the  South, 
undermining technological upgrading and the development of industries with higher 
value added
37.   
Table 3.2.2: Tariff escalation in Textile and related goods and on total industry, in 
percentage 
 
Textiles and leather  Total industry   
(I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
US  2,9  9,1  10  2,3  4,7  5,5 
EU  0,8  6,2  9,2  8,6
38  4,8  7,0 
Notes:   (I) refers to first stage of processing; (II) refers to semi-processed goods; and (III) refers to 
fully processed goods. 
Source: WTO (2004), page 13. 
                                                 
35 Mayer (2004), page 6. 
36 WTO (2004), page 12. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 The EU presents high tariff on food beverages and tobacco (about 14,6 percent) explaining the high 




Tariff  escalations  often  generate  tariff  peaks,  which  are  tariffs  presenting  a  high 
dispersion relative to the average MFN rate applied. T&C imports are subject to an 
extensive  use  of  tariff  peaks  in  both  the  North  and  the  South.  Because  the  tariff 
structure differs across countries, tariff peaks measured at national level differ from 
the  international  level  rate.  Therefore,  “domestic  peaks”  are  the  tariff  three  times 
greater than the national average, while “international peaks” are tariffs exceeding a 
rate  of  15  percent
39.  This  definition  implies  that  an  international  peak  can  be  a 
domestic peak in a country having a relatively low average rate, without being a tariff 
peak in countries presenting high tariffs averages
40. From 15 to 30 percent of exports 
from LDC were subject to tariff peaks. Product lines covered by tariff peaks go from 
1,6 percent in Canada to more than 5 percent in the US, the EU and Japan
41.  
According to Amiti & Romalis (2004), duties imposed by the US and the EU on 
goods for which LDC have competitive advantage are higher for DC and non-African 
LDC than those paid by industrial countries exporting the same products, implying 
that the actual tariff structure does not benefit DC
42.  
NAMA negotiations address trade liberalization in manufactures, fisheries, minerals 
and forestry goods – products that are not covered by the agreement on Agriculture
43. 
The  main  objectives  of  these  negotiations  are  full  binding  coverage,  rapid  and 
continuous liberalization, and harmonization of tariffs across countries, plus greater 
uniformity of tariffs across product lines
44. All these objectives affect directly the 
trade policy of DC, but only the uniformity of tariffs across product lines concerns 
preference erosion. 
                                                 
39 WTO at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm 
40 Cordoba & Vanzetti (2005), page 9. 
41 WTO (2004), page 8, footnotes. 
42 According to Amiti & Romalis (2004), page 10, non-African LDC’ tariffs amount 13.53 percent in 
the US and 5.35 percent in the EU; DC’ rate is 3.96 percent and 2.35 percent; while industrial countries 
face only 2.8 percent in the US and 1.56 percent in the EU.   
43 WTO at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm 
44  Full  binding  coverage  refers  to  increasing  permanently  the  tariffs’  binding  coverage  in  DC. 
Developed countries have full binding coverage but the same does not hold to DC and LDC. Actually, 
DC make  an extensive use of  trade policy  as an instrument to boost  their industries. Increases in 
binding  coverage  imply  lost  of  flexibility  to  uses  tariffs  to  protect  sensitive  sectors.  Rapid  and 
continuous  liberalization  refers  to  reduction  in  tariffs  over  time,  converging  to  free  trade. 
Harmonization of tariffs refers to reduction in tariff dispersion across countries, principally between 
developed countries and DC, estimated to be about 12 percent. Akyüs (2005), pages 3 to 6.  
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The modalities of tariffs reduction are still under negotiation. It was decided to use a 
Swiss type formula
45 approach in order to enhance transparency, predictability and 
equity in market access negotiations
46. It was expected that negotiations on market 
access would be over in May 2003. The deadline was postponed to August 2004, and 
then to the Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005.  The strong divergence on 
interests between developed countries, DC and LDC limits the capacity of negotiators 
to attain an agreement.  
3.  The Quota System 
The Multifibre Agreement of 1974 provided the framework for unilateral quantitative 
restrictions  on  exports  of  T&C  to  the  US,  Canada,  Norway  and  EC
47.  The  MFA 
quantity restriction takes the form of voluntary export restraints (VER), which are 
discriminatory and bilaterally negotiated
48. In other words, the VER are imposed on 
some countries but not globally, and its severity in terms of product coverage and 
degree of restrictiveness varies across countries. As they are supply side restraints, the 
exporting countries governments control the volume of exports by issuing licenses to 
their exporters
49. 
Quotas  are  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  that  increase  domestic  prices  by 
artificially limiting supply of the quota-restricted good. The artificial scarcity creates a 
“price wedge”
50 between international and domestic prices, benefiting those producers 
having access to the restricted market. By selling to a restricted market, exporters can 
increase profits by this price wedge, capturing quota rents
51. 
A  quota  that  “effectively  limits  the  supply  of  a  product”
52  is  known  as  “binding 
quota” and is measured by its utilization rate. Since once a quota is filled the restricted 
market  is  closed
53,  binding  quotas  can  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  degree  of 
restrictiveness faced by an exporter. Although the literature diverges about the filling 
                                                 
45 The “Swiss formula” is discussed in Section 5. 
46 WTO at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm 
47 Ibidem. 
48 Dean et al (2004), page 2. 
49 Ibidem 
50 Expression used by The Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). 
51 The Commonwealth Secretariat (2004), page 15. 
52 Dean et al (2004), page 2. 
53 However there are some provisions allowing countries to adjust the quota level for some products 
where the quantity released exceeds the limit imposed, by using limits of other product lines.  
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rate  determining  a  binding  quota,  most  authors  believe  a  fill  rate  higher  than  95 
percent to be binding. Conversely, some authors consider that even quotas showing 
low utilization rate can be binding in exporting countries
54.  
The tables 3.4 and 3.5 presents the number of quotas having utilization rates larger 
than 95 percent and those filled  at 100 percent, for some selected countries. It is 
possible that quotas presenting a filled rate below 100 percent effectively restrict trade 
because a good management of exported quantity
55, as well as due to a poor control of 
the quantity released
56.  
Table 3.3.1: Number of US apparel quotas filled up at 95 and 100 percent, MFA 
categories, selected countries. 
 
  1998  2000  2002  2004 
Fill rate  95%  100%  95%  100%  95%  100%  95%  100% 
Bangladesh  9  3  9  2  6  2  0  0 
China  8  1  8  0  6  1  7  0 
India  5  0  0  0  2  0  2  0 
Hong Kong  4  0  5  0  2  0  2  0 





Table 3.3.2: Number of EU apparel quotas filled up at 95 and 100 percent, ATC 
categories, selected countries. 
 
  1998  2000  2002  2004 
Fill rate  95%  100%  95%  100%  95%  100%  95%  100% 
China  18  17  22  16  15  9  13  7 
India  4  3  4  4  6  6  5  3 
Hong Kong  7  4  8  3  5  3  3  1 
Pakistan  3  0  3  1  2  2  3  3 
Vietnam  10  8  10  7  14  13  8  7 
Source: SIGL
58 
The  quota  system  generates  strong  distortion  on  the  T&C  trade,  as  well  as  on 
investment patterns. Quota rents generate strong incentives to resource allocation in 
sectors  producing  restricted  goods,  bringing  producers  to  enter  the  market 
                                                 
54 Dean et al (2004), page  2. 
55 This could be the case of Hong Kong, who presents a high number of the US quotas with a filled rate 
larger than 95 percent.  
56 This may be the case of Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
57 United States Customs and Border Protection at  
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/textiles_and_quotas/textile_status_report/archived/ 
58 Système Intégré de Gestion des Licenses at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/sigl/choice.html  
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independently of their competitiveness
59. Because quantitative restrictions investment 
flows are attracted by countries having both low labor costs and high quota base. 
Once the larger established low cost producers reached their export ceiling, filling up 
the limits imposed by importers, other countries will receive the investment needed to 
start up their apparel industry
60. This applies to Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh,  but  also  to  smaller  exporters  such  as  Lesotho,  Swaziland  and  Nepal. 
Although development of an apparel industry is considered an important means to 
fight  poverty  in  DC  and  LDC,  many  exporters  under  the  MFA  regime  may  be 
economically inefficient preference-dependent economies.  
At the end of the Uruguay Round it was agreed by a voluntary commitment, known as 
“Textiles and Clothing Agreement” (ATC), to integrate T&C goods in the GATT 
1994 and to phase out quotas gradually over a ten years period. The ATC requires the 
integration of articles from four different groups of products, representing minimum 




Table 3.3.3: ATC quotas phasing out 
 
Phase  Starting at  Products Integrated  
(in % of 1990 imports) 
Annual growth rates of 
existing quotas (%) 
1  January 1995  16  16 
2  January 1998  17  25 
3  January 2002  18  27 
Source: WTO 
 
The  elimination  of quotas  should be  gradual,  allowing  importers  and  exporters  to 
prepare their industries to a quota-free world. Because the importing countries were 
free to choose which products would be integrated on each phase of the process, most 
of  the  articles  integrated  in  the  first  stage  were  not  under  quotas,  while  those 
integrated in the second and third stages presented low utilization rates, leaving the 
categories  presenting  high  values  and  utilization  rates
62.  Hence  89  percent  of  US 
                                                 
59 The Commonwealth Secretariat (2004), page 15. 
60 Freund et al (2004), page 2-7. 
61 WTO at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm 
62 Andriamananjara et al (2004), page 61.  
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imports on apparel and 47 percent of its textiles imports will be integrated in January 
2005
63. 
The quotas phasing out may cause a reallocation of RMG production and a drop in 
relative prices. Countries that have been facing more restrictive market access may 
have  an  improvement  of  their  competitive  position
64.  Preference-dependent 
economies may suffer losses in output, employment and exports revenues coming 
from  two  sources:  the  loss  of  quota  rents  and  losses  from  supply  changes
65.  An 
increase  in  global  trade  is  expected,  yet  the  impact  may  differ  across  countries. 
Apparel companies and retailers will likely reduce the merchandise’s cost structure by 
consolidating their sourcing among fewer competitive and reliable producers
66.  
The end of the quotas system may also change the international investment pattern. 
Under the MFA the main factors influencing investment and sourcing decisions were 
the quota availability and its costs. With the quotas phasing-out other factors will 
grow  in  importance,  such  as  the  factors  of  production’s  cost  and  availability, 
economic governance, good infrastructure (roads, ports, reliable sources of energy and 
water)  as  well  as  the  reliability,  efficiency  and  flexibility  of  suppliers  and  the 
proximity to major world markets
67.  
 
                                                 
63 Ibidem. 
64 Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 3. 
65 Commonwealth Secretariat (2004), page 16. 
66 Freund et al (2004), page 3-1. 
67 Op.cité, page 3-4. Freund et al (2004) presents the results of a survey about the main factors that may 
influence investment and sourcing decisions in a quota free environment.  
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4.  Major Players: Overview 
 
The world T&C sector exhibits different degrees of specialization across countries, 
suggesting a tendency to segmentation around three different types of goods: low 
prices RMG, brand goods sector and a fashion segment
68. The low prices wearing 
apparel may be produced in DC, while brand and fashion goods may be produced in 
both industrial countries and DC presenting high value activities
69.  
Most of the world’s apparel exports go to the EU, US and Japan
70. The EU apparel 
trade  is  mainly  intra-EU,  accounting  for  two  third  of  its  imports.  The  EU  is 
responsible for 36.4 percent of the world exports, although about 80 percent is traded 
within the EU. The extra-EU (25) trade embraces only 7.4 percent of the world’s total 
exports.  The European T&C sector is mostly concentrated in brand and fashion goods 
presenting high quality, creativity and innovation. A significant part of the industry 
presents low product differentiation with respect to imports coming from low costs 
competitors, and may suffer from trade liberalization
71.  
As in most developed countries, the US apparel industry presented a steady decline 
over the past decades, mostly due to both the increase in import competition and the 
clothing production’s relocation in low cost Latin American neighbors
72. The US is 
responsible for 28 percent of the world’s imports in clothing, but the sector is not 
export oriented, embracing only 2 percent of the international T&C trade. 
Among  restricted  countries,  China  and  Hong  Kong  are  major  single  players 
accounting for more than one fourth of the global T&C exports. China is the world 
largest supplier of textiles and apparel with 16 percent of the world’s market share
73. 
China has abundant supply of young educated workers, allowing relative low wages 
                                                 
68 IFM (2004), page 155. 
69 High value activities refer to the “value derived from significant fashion content, better quality and 
prices, reactive production, integrated design, sophisticated fabric handle and touch etc”. IFM (2004), 
page 173. Among the DC included in this study, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and India may 
present high value activities. 
70 A table presenting the world’s main apparel importers and exporters is available in the annex to 
Section III.  
71IFM (2004), page 12. 
72 Op.cité, page 218. 




74. Its T&C industry is fully integrated and the production is 
strongly rationalized
75.  In addition, China has efficient infrastructures. Conversely, 
China lacks in design and fashion capabilities and marketing know-how
76.  
Exports  from  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  and  Macau  declined  between  1997  and  2001, 
mostly due to a shift in T&C production to lower wage suppliers, namely China. 
Conversely, the worldwide investment in apparel industry from companies originating 
from these countries rose during the same period
77. South Korea has a high-skilled 
high-wages labor force. In order to keep the market share it developed a high value 
added T&C sector by producing technical textiles, design and fashion
78.  
Both  Pakistan  and  India  have  poor  infrastructure  and  excessive  government’s 
regulations. Pakistan exports rely heavily on intermediate textiles products. It presents 
a large supply of cheap unskilled labor and access to raw materials. Still, it is likely 
that Pakistan will continue to be a global supplier of cotton and fabrics
79. India has a 
T&C sector covering the entire production chain, cheap labor but low productivity 
when compared with China. It has skilled labor and design expertise, producing a 
broad  assortment  of  wearing  apparel.  It  is  one  of  the  world’s  largest  textiles 
producers
80.  However  India  lacks  on  roads  and  ports  infrastructure,  and  has  an 
inefficient electricity supply. 
Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia’s industry is vertically integrated with a large 
synthetic fiber manufacturing industry, however social and political instability may 
reduce its competitiveness
81. Cambodia and Vietnam are two of the fastest growing 
exporters of T&C in the world
82.  
 
                                                 
74 According to IFM (2004), page 177, labor costs in China is 20 % higher than India and Sri Lanka, 40 
%  than  Indonesia,  100  %  than  Pakistan,  180  %  than  Bangladesh.  However,  when  productivity, 
reliability and indirect costs are brought into the picture, China’s quality / price ratio is unbeatable: Its 
cost per minute averages are the same as in India, Indonesia or Viet Nam and 25 % less than in 
Pakistan. 
75 IFM (2004), page 167. 
76 Op.cité, page 172. 
77 Freund et al (2004), page E-3. 
78 IFM (2004), page 168. 
79 Freund et al (2004), page 3-15. 
80 Op. cit., page 3-15. 
81 Op. cit. pages G-6 and 3-16. 
82 Op. cit. pages G-5.  
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IV.  Bangladesh 
1.  Overview 
Bangladesh is situated in Southern Asia, bordering the Bay of Bengal, between Burma 
and India. Most of the country is flat alluvial plain, being regularly inundated during 
the  summer  monsoon  season,  hampering  the  economic  development
83.  During  the 
British  colonization,  Bangladesh  was  part  of  East  India  territories,  which  became 
independent in August 1947. East India was divided between Hindus and Muslins, 
giving birth to India and Pakistan, the latter being divided in two territories separated 
by the former. Because the hegemonic policy undertaken by Islamabad, the eastern 
territory  began  to  ask  for  more  autonomy.  In  December  1971,  after  a  war  that 
devastated its economy, the East Pakistan became an independent state: the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh
84.  
After independency, Bangladeshi economy faced severe external sector difficulties 
coming  from  both  a  large  domestic  deficit  and  an  expansionary  monetary  policy, 
leading to an overvaluation of the real exchange rate
85. From 1972 to 1975, the regime 
became highly interventionist, imposing strong protectionist measures and massive 
nationalization of manufacturing and services sectors
86.  
From 1975 to 1991, Bangladesh was governed by the army. Taking distance from the 
socialist  government,  the  new  regime  started  to  deregulate  the  economy  through 
policy reforms and liberalization. As long run strategy was lacking, the extent of these 
reforms stayed narrow. In the mid-eighties, the structural adjustment policies imposed 
by  the  “Washington  Consensus”  brought  more  effective  liberalization  to  the 
economy
87.  Because  highly  unpopular,  these  measures  caused  social  conflict 
outbreaks, ending the military regime.  
During the early 1990’s, the new (democratic) regime started an ambitious plan for 
trade  liberalization  and  economic  stabilization.  Implemented  trade  liberalization 
                                                 
83 At https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bg.html 
84 Historical overview from Cordelier, Serge, “Le dictionnaire historique et géopolitique du 20ème 
siècle”, la Découverte, Paris, 2002, pages 67 and 68. 
85 Rahman, N.  (2005), page 107. 
86 The rate of State-owned enterprises rose from 34 percent in 1970 to 92 percent in 1972. Ibidem. 
87 Ibidem.  
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measures included reduction on import tariffs, elimination of quotas and other non-
tariff barriers, and flexible exchange rate regime. In order to encourage foreign direct 
investment and promote exports, two export processing zones (EPZ) were created
88. 
From  2002,  Bangladesh  started  to  benefit  also  from  preferential  access  to  the 
European market through the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) program
89. 
 
2.  Apparel Industry in Bangladesh 
From 1976 to 1985, the average GDP growth was 3.8 percent
90, passing to 4.8 percent 
during the 1990s, and reaching an average growth of 5.4 percent from 2000 to 2006. 
However steady, the income growth was offset by a high birth rate. From mid 1980s, 
a stable decline in natality enabled a boost in the growth rate of GDP per capita which 
passed from 237 US$ in 1985 to 443 US$ in 2004. 
















Source: United Nations Statistic Division and staff calculation 
                                                 
88 Op.cite, pages 107 to 110. 
89 From 1971 Bangladesh is beneficiary of the UNCTAD’s General System of Preferences (GSP). 
However, the GSP does not include T&C goods. In 2001 two programs including preferential access to 
wearing apparel were created: the European “Everything But Arms” (EBA) benefiting all LDC, and the 
North-American “African Growth Opportunity Act” (AGOA) benefiting only African LDC. The US 
has  no  preferential  access  program  for  T&C  exports  coming  from  Asian  LDC,  probably  because 
Bangladesh is a huge exporter. 
90 Liu et al (2005), page 5.  
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According to the IMF (2005), sound macroeconomic policies, together with financial 
and trade reforms, are the key factors explaining Bangladesh growth. These reforms 
had an impact on the income as well as on its structure
91.  However, Bangladesh still 
is a “rural based economy”
92 where the agriculture employs about 22.9 percent of 
manpower, being accountable for about 20 percent of the GDP in 2003. 
Apparel  is  the  largest  single  contributor  to  the  past  decade’s  growth,  becoming  a 
dominating sector in Bangladesh’s export earnings. Nevertheless, it represented only 
9 percent of the GDP in 2000
93, mostly due to a lack of domestic inputs, reducing the 
value  added  and  profit  margins  of  the  RMG  sector.  In  2004,  Bangladesh’s  value 
added by the industry in the GDP was 19 points lower than China’s
94. 
Bangladesh was the 9
th largest exporter of wearing apparel in 2004, embracing 2.2 
percent of the world market. RMG exports represented only 10 percent of total export 
earnings in 1984, passing to about 75 percent in 2004 
95. While the exports of the 
clothing  industry  boosted,  the  participation  of  the  traditional  jute  sector  in  total 
exports earnings diminished
96.  














T&C  exports  in  2004  accounted  for  82,3  percent  of  total  value  of  Bangladesh’s 
exports, where RMG accounted for 71.9 percent. The main importing markets are the 
                                                 
91 Rahman, N.  (2005), page 103. 
92 Freund et al (2004), page F-4. 
93 Ibidem. 
94 Ibidem. 
95 Liu (2005), page 9. 
96 Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 7  
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US  and  EU,  accounting  for  82.2  percent  of  its  total  exports,  suggesting  a  strong 
reliance on restricted markets. 
Table 4.2.1: Bangladesh’s exports and share of exports to restricted markets in million 
US$ and percentage. 
 
1997  1999  2001 
  Value  Share  Value  Share  Value  Share 
United States  1559  41%  1891  43%  2352  43% 
European Union  1859  48%  2092  48%  2742  50% 
Canada  78  2%  93  2%  115  2% 
Total restricted markets  3496  91%  4076  93%  5209  95% 
All other   341  9%  296  7%  317  6% 
Source: USITC 
 
The development of RMG sector in Bangladesh is the consequence of restrictions in 
market  access  due  to  the  quota  regime.  Originally  launched  by  foreign  investors 
looking for quota access to restricted markets and abundant cheap labor, the apparel 
industry in Bangladesh became mostly domestic owned due to a government policy 
restricting the access to foreign investors
97. In order to preserve apparel quota rents to 
domestic manufacturers, foreign investment’s access was restricted to the EPZ, which 
represents only about 10 percent of total exports
98.  
At the present, Bangladesh has a large export driven apparel industry, completely 
private owned
99 and representing an important source of income to the poor. RMG is 
the sector with the fastest and largest growth rate in the economy, being responsible 
for more the 2 million of direct jobs, most of them occupied by women. The apparel 
industry is also responsible for about 10 million of indirect employment
100.  
On the other hand, the textile industry is small and inefficient. Most of the home 
produced textiles inputs do not meet the international quality standards. In 1999, only 
10 percent of mills could produce export quality yarns, representing only 20 percent 
of domestic demand.
101 95 percent of the cotton used by the T&C sector is imported, 
mostly from India and the US. Cotton imports are expected to rise about fivefold from 
                                                 
97Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 6. 
98 Ibidem. 
99 Freund et al (2004) page F-5. 
100 Op.cité page F-5; Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 5. 
101 According to Freund &  all. (2004),  in 2000, about  70  percent of apparel industry inputs  were 




102.In order to reduce Bangladesh’s dependency on imported inputs the 
government started to provide incentives to modernize the sector, expanding textiles’ 
production. As a result, the knitted garment industry was able to comply with the 51 
percent of domestic and regional value added requirement
103 and export to the EU by 
preferential channel. 
 
3.  Competitive Analysis 
Weak  governance  and  poor  infrastructure  hamper  Bangladesh’s  export 
competitiveness
104. In addition, the lack of inputs to the apparel industry may present 
a serious risk once quotas are removed.  
Factors of Production 
Bangladesh has an abundant supply of low cost labor, accounting roughly 61 million 
of people
105, though low skills level undermines productivity. The country’s apparel 
industry hourly wages are about 0.39 US$, one of the lowest wages among Asian 
producers
106. While wages and fringe benefits in China are about twice Bangladesh’s 




Table 4.3.1: Comparing labor costs and productivity, selected countries 
 
  Labor Costs  Value added 
Per employee 
Wages  Productivity 
Country  US$/Shirt  US$  $/year  Shirts/worker/year 
Bangladesh  0.11  900  290  2536 
India  0.26  2600  668  2592 
Pakistan  0.43  2500  1343  3100 
Source: Freund et al (2004), page 3-7 and Yang & Mlachila (2004), page 20 
 
                                                 
102 Freund et al (2004), page F-6 
103 Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 10. 
104 Baysan et al (2005), page ii. 
105  This  refers  to  the  work  force  only.  The  total  population  in  2004  was  about  137  million  of 
inhabitants. 
106 Freund et al (2004), page 3-7. 
107 Ibidem.  
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Bangladesh  is  highly  dependent  on  imported  inputs.  Under  the  MFA  regime 
Bangladesh  could  enjoy  importing  inputs  at  international  prices,  reducing 
significantly  production  costs.  The  elimination  of  quantitative  restrictions  may 
increase China’s demand for textiles, affecting its international prices. In addition, 
there  is  a  risk  that  traditional  suppliers  aim  to  develop  their  own  RMG  industry, 
causing shortage of supplies
108. Finally, the restrictions imposed on input’s imports
109 
may increase the lead-time, reducing the flexibility to respond to quick turnaround 
orders. 
In addition, Bangladesh’s export base is concentrated on a small range of goods such 
as T-shirts, shirts, trousers, jackets and sweaters
110. The low diversification level of 
the apparel industry may increase the sector’s vulnerability to changes in international 
demand.  
Infrastructure 
Bangladesh has poor transport infrastructure. In 2004, only 10 percent of its total 
roads were paved, compared to 45.7 percent in India and 97.5 percent in Thailand
111. 
In addition, roads are poorly constructed, with inadequate maintenance. Furthermore, 
Bangladesh  suffers  from  low  integration  of  different  modalities  of  transportation, 
undermining private activity
112.  
Bangladesh  also  lacks  in  port  structure.  The  main  export  gateway  is  the  port  of 
Chittagong
113,  coping  with  85  percent  of  all  goods  traded  by  the  country
114.  It  is 
poorly  managed,  has  obsolete  machinery  and  labor  unrest,  resulting  in  low 
productivity, high costs and low terminal container’s capacity. Ship turnaround time is 
5  to  9  times  higher  than  a  standard  efficient  port
115,  affecting  apparel  producer’s 
                                                 
108 IFM et al (2004), page 250. 
109  For  example,  all  inputs  imported  from  India  have  to  be  shipped  to  Chittagong  port,  often  via 
Singapore. Baysan et al (2005), page 35. 
110 IFM (2005) page 247 
111 World Bank Development Indicators Database at  
 http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html 
112 Baysan et al (2005), page 24. 
113 Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 22. 
114 Baysan et al (2005), page 24. 
115 Ibidem.  
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flexibility.  In  addition,  imported  inputs  face  time-consuming  customs  procedures, 
excessive regulation, and high corruption
116.  
Industries  in  Bangladesh  also  suffer  from  water  and  electricity  shortages.  The 
electricity access covers only 30 percent of the population, 80 percent of which are in 
urban  areas.  Bangladesh’s  per  capita  electricity  generating  capacity  is  11  times 
smaller  than  Thailand’s,  8  times  smaller  than  China’s,  and  4  times  smaller  than 
India’s. The telecommunication services are underdeveloped
117. With 8.3 telephones 
mainlines per 1’000 inhabitants, Bangladesh’s communications facilities are 70 times 
smaller than China
118.  
Foreign Direct Investment 
The international investment in Bangladesh is low, in part because underdeveloped 
infrastructure, but principally due to government restrictions to foreign investment: 
The  FDI  entering  apparel  sector  must  be  associated  with  the  development  of 
backward linkage facilities
119.  
FDI is frequently associated with  transfer of technical and  managerial skills from 
abroad.  By  restricting  it,  the  government  slows  down  export  diversification  and 
production  upgrading,  reducing  Bangladesh’s  competitiveness  to  low  wages  and 
quota access
120. In addition, Bangladesh has been kept aside of global value chains 
loosing important channels to export sales
121. 
According to the UNCTAD FDI inward index
122, which ranks countries by the FDI 
inflows in relation to their economic size, Bangladesh’s FDI attractiveness is quite 
low. In the period between 2002 and 2004, it ranks 122
nd in 140 countries, while 
                                                 
116 According to Baysan et al (2005), page 26, the time needed to get a shipment of products across the 
customs is on average 11.7 days. The same procedure in India or Chine takes 7.5 days, and in Malaysia 
only 3.4 days. 
117  According to  Baysan  et  al  (2005),  page  26,  Bangladesh  has  one  public  call office  per  32’000 
habitants. India has 1 per 1’000. The average cost per telephone is 10 times higher in Bangladesh than 
in India.  
118 Ibidem. 
119 Op.cité, page 35. 
120 Yang & Mlachila (2005), page 22. 
121 Ibidem. 
122 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2471&lang=1  
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Hong Kong ranks 7
th, China 45
th and Vietnam 50
th. In 2003, only 0.29 percent of the 
FDI entering the country went to T&C industry
123. 
 
Graph 4.3: FDI inward performance index, 2002 to 2004, selected countries. 
 
























The quota removal will change the sourcing pattern, and other variables will gain 
importance, such as business climate, which includes social and political stability, 
safety of personal, and government incentives to trade, as well as transparency and 
predictability of legal and regulatory systems, and corruption level
124.  
According  to  the  World Bank,  governance can be  defined  as  “ the  traditions  and 
institutions by which authority is exercised for the common good”
 125.  The quality of 
governance has three dimensions: political, economic and institutional. The political 
dimension includes the process of selection, control and replacement of the political 
authority.  The  institutional  and  economic  dimensions  refer  to  the  respect  for  the 
economic and social institutions, as well as the government’s capacity to manage its 
resources and implement policies
126.  
                                                 
123 http://www.jetro.go.jp/bangladesh/eng/link_files/fdi_swfipboi0405.html 
124 Freund et al (2004), page 3-7. 
125 The World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance 
126 The World Bank developed six indicators of good governance. They are “voice and accountability” 
(which  includes  the  political  regime  and  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  association  and  free 
media); “political stability and absence of violence”; “government effectiveness” (including the quality 
of  public  services,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and  implementation,  and  the  government’s 
credibility); the “regulatory quality” to promote the development of the private sector; “the rule of law”  
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Table 4.3.2 compares the market share, the World Bank’s governance indexes and the 
CPI for Bangladesh and its main competitors. Voice and accountability seem to have 
a small impact on market share. Without accounting voice and accountability, and 
political stability, Bangladesh presents the weakest governance.  
Table 4.3.2: Comparing market share and good governance indexes for some selected 
countries, values from 0 to 10. 
Exporter 
Market 













China         0.34  3.40  1.96 4.69 5.10  4.23 4.17 3.82 
Bangladesh         0.18  1.50  3.68 2.80 3.51  2.68 3.22 2.42 
India         0.10  2.80  5.57 2.83 4.95  4.05 4.97 4.24 
Hong Kong         0.07  8.00  5.44 7.39 8.13  8.75 7.76 8.12 
Indonesia         0.06  2.00  4.14 1.80 4.17  4.12 3.36 3.08 
Thailand         0.05  3.60  5.50 4.25 5.74  5.24 5.00 4.40 
South Korea         0.04  4.50  6.53 5.88 6.85  6.51 6.33 5.24 
Pakistan         0.04  2.10  2.38 1.67 3.97  3.22 3.34 2.88 
Sri Lanka         0.03  3.50  4.65 2.72 4.41  5.16 5.04 4.66 
Taiwan         0.02  5.60  6.93 6.01 7.38  7.22 6.64 6.26 
Philippines         0.01  2.60  5.05 2.55 4.66  4.61 3.67 3.84 
Vietnam         0.01  2.60  1.96 5.48 4.27  3.79 3.80 3.38 
Sources: The World Bank
127 and The Transparency International 
 
Weak  governance  hampers  Bangladesh’s  export  competitiveness
128.  Corruption  is 
endemic
129, mostly due to excessive regulation. The export-oriented apparel sector 
faces  complex  customs  regulations  when  importing  inputs  and  machinery
130, 
facilitating corruption. According to Corruption’s Perceptions Index (CPI) from the 
Transparency International, Bangladesh ranks last among 145 countries, while China 
ranks 71
st, India 90
th and Pakistan 129
th 131. 
                                                                                                                                            
(which  includes  the  quality  of  contract  enforcement);  and  the  “control  of  corruption”  The  WB 
homepage presents the indicators definitions and explanations about the methodology used to construct 
them.  Ibidem.  
127 The indexes go from 0 to 10. The original coefficients have values from –2.5 to + 2.5.  
128 Baysan et al (2005), page ii. 
129 Op.cite, page 22. 
130 According to Baysan et al (2005), page 52, bribes paid at the point of import increases machinery 
prices by about 10 percent.  
131 The CPI is available at http://www.transparency.org/  
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The analysis of the RMG exporters’ performance during the different phases of ATC 
quota  liberalization  suggests  that  Bangladesh,  and  most  of  the  other  Asian  T&C 
exporters, may lose market share to China once the quotas are completely eliminated. 
Graph 4.4 shows the losses in market share for Asian apparel exporters from China’s 
accession to the WTO
132. 














  Source: Mayer (2004), page 17. 
 
However there is a limit to China’s capacity to increase exports without increasing 
costs.  Also,  China  shows  a  tendency  to  produce  goods  with  higher  value  added, 
reducing  the  importance of apparel on its  total exports. Graph 4.5 shows China’s 
manufactures’  exports  trends  from  1990  to  2004.  From  1998,  clothing  share  in 
manufactured  exports  is  decreasing  steadily,  while  exports  in  fabricated  metal 
products and machineries increases.  
                                                 
132 China became WTO member in 11 December 2001, and started to benefits from the ATC gradual 
quota liberalization, explaining at least in part its export performance from 2002.   
 
  31
















The end of quotas system may reduce prices, but the effects on global demand are 
uncertain. An increase in the global demand could absorb and compensate in part the 
export losses for some countries
133.  
In order to face the new apparel trade environment, Bangladesh has to fight corruption 
and increase good governance. Also, It has to review the government’s investment 
policy  in  order  to  attract  the  foreign  investment  necessary  to  develop  trade 
infrastructure, as well as to modernize and integrate the RMG industry. Finally, it has 
to  simplify  the  custom  regulations  related  with  imports  of  inputs  and  machinery 
needed to the export-oriented sector, reducing as well the scope for corruption. 
 
                                                 
133 Ernst et al (2005), page 20.  
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V.  Estimating Preference Erosion under NAMA Negotiations 
The first step to estimate the PE is to calculate the actual preference margin enjoyed 
by Bangladeshi exports. The preference margin at tariff line level is “the difference in 
percentage points between the most favored nation (MFN) and the preferential tariff 
rate”
134.  According  to  Low  &  all  (2005),  preference  margins  as  a  measure  of 
preferences  present  some  limitations  because  they  do  not  take  into  account  the 
importance of the product line covered by the preferences on the overall exports of the 
preference receiving country. In order to avoid this problem, tariffs (and preferences) 
faced by Bangladesh are weighed by the value of its exports on each product line 
(HS
135 6 digits level).  
Bangladesh  relies  on  preferences  schemas  for  its  exports,  receiving  unilateral 
preferences from the EU (duty-free and quota-free access), but not from the US
136. 
 
Table 5.1.1: Exports in million US$, tariffs and preference margins, in percentage
137. 
 















apparel   415  13.28%  0.01%  2’777  0.00%  11.85% 
Not  knitted 
RMG   1’138  9.98%  0.21%  1’728  0.00%  11.94% 
Other  made 
up textiles   55  7.68%  0.19%  32  0.00%  11.04% 
Data source: Dataset 
 
The preference margin measures the maximum tariffs “waiver” a country can enjoy. 
However, the exported product has to fulfill the RoO to be eligible to preferential 
access, which generates an administrative burden. Francois et al (2005) estimate this 
compliance costs to be about 4 percent of the products value in average, while Cadot 
                                                 
134 Low et al (2005), page 11.  
135 HS refers to “Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
136 Bangladesh is eligible to the US GSP (General System of Preferences) program. But the US GSP 
excludes  most  of  T&C  products,  which  explains  the  low  values  of  preference  margin  enjoyed  by 
Bangladesh. Until January 2005, US imposed quotas on Bangladeshi exports. 
137 Values for 2004. The product lines included in this section are those used in the gravity model 
presented in the next section. 
138 From an exporting country point of view, PM can be seen as the difference between the MFN tariffs 
and the tariffs it faces when exporting.  For countries enjoying preferential access, Preference margin 
(%) = MFN tariff (%) - Preferential tariff (%)  
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et al (2005) situate this value between 6.8 and 8 percent
139. Because the preference 
margins in the US are far below compliance costs, we assume that all exports entering 
this country pay the MFN tariffs.  
On the other hand, while the preference margin is potentially high in the EU markets, 
Bangladeshi  utilization  rates  are  quite  low.   Inama  (2005)  estimates  Bangladesh’s 
utilization rates in the order of 49.55 percent for knitted apparel, 13.01 percent for not 
knitted RMG and 75.21 percent for other manufactured textiles.  
After  controlling  for  compliance  costs  (estimated  to  be  about  4  percent)  and  low 
utilization rates, the net preference margin of Bangladesh in the EU is far from its 
initial  value.  The  low  utilization  rate,  especially  for  non-knitted  RMG  products, 
diminishes  the  risk  of  vulnerability  due  to  tariffs  reduction,  but  also  raises  the 
question about the scope of preferential access to European markets. 
 























11.85%  7.8500%  100.00%  49.55%  3.89%  108’045 
Not knitted RMG 
 
11.94%  7.9400%  100.00%  13.01%  1.03%  17’805 
 
Other made up textiles articles  11.04%  7.0400%  99.92%  75.21%  5.29%  1’708 
Data source: McMap from ITC, Dataset and staff calculations 
 
Having the values of PM for Bangladesh, the second step is to simulate changes on 
the US and the EU clothing MFN tariffs
141 by using the Swiss formula. The Swiss 
formula is a non-linear formula presenting an important quality: While linear formula 
reduction  keeps  the  proportion  between  high  and  low  tariffs,  the  Swiss  formula 
reduces higher tariffs rates more than lower tariff rates, and this in both absolute and 
                                                 
139 Cadot et al (2005), page 22, find that compliance costs when NAFTA countries export to the US are 
about 6.8 per cent, and these same costs are about 8 per cent when PANEURO countries export to the 
EU.  
140 Preference margin net of compliance costs = Preference margin (%) - compliance costs (%) 
141 NAMA negotiations aim tariffs reductions for all WTO members. However, when estimating PE 




142.  Because  it  fixes  a  ceiling  positive  tariff  rate  (given  by  its 
coefficient), “it is particularly effective in reducing tariff peaks since even the highest 
tariffs are reduced below the value [of the coefficient] ‘a’.” 








Where:    a is the ceiling positive tariff rate 
t0 is the initial tariff 
tSF is the final tariff 
Because this formula is applied in a line-by-line basis, the simulations have to be 
carried out at the subheadings level (HS-6 digits level). Applying this formula with 
coefficients 6 and 10 on the MFN tariffs of the US and the EU gives the following 
reductions: 
 
Table5.1. 3: Tariff simulation under different scenarios 
 











SF 6  SF 10  SF 6  SF 10 
MFN 
SF 6  SF 10  SF 6  SF 10 
Knitted 
apparel  13.28%  3.88%  5.32%  9.40%  7.96%  11.85%  3.99%  5.42%  7.86%  6.43% 
Not 
knitted  9.98%  3.54%  4.72%  6.44%  5.26%  11.94%  3.99%  5.44%  7.95%  6.50% 
Other 
  7.68%  3.07%  4.03%  4.61%  3.65%  11.04%  3.74%  5.08%  7.30%  5.96% 
Data source: McMap from ITC and staff calculations. 
 
A reduction on MFN tariff decreases preference margins. In the new tariff regime 
many  preference-receiving  countries  will  do  better  by  not  using  their  preferential 
access. Actually, depending on the coefficient used to reduce the MFN tariff, the 
difference between compliance costs and reduced preferences margins is too small, 
even negative. Where there is some margin left, it will not be enough to compensate 
for complying with RoO
144.  
                                                 
142 François & Manole (2005), page 5. 
143 Ibidem. 
144The simulation using the Swiss formula with the coefficient equal to 6 eliminates Bangladesh’s 
preference margin in the EU. The simulation using the Swiss formula with coefficient equal to 10 let a 
preference margin of 0.7 percent for knitted apparel, 0.18 percent for not knitted and 0.81 percent for 
other clothing products.  
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The reduction on MFN tariffs causes a drop on preference margins enjoyed in the EU, 
but also a diminution on tariffs costs in the US market. In 2004, the value of the US 
tariffs on Bangladeshi exports was about US$173 million. In the European market, 
while Bangladesh had US$ 192 million of duty release due to it preferential access
145, 
the tariff fee on exports not covered by preferences was about US$ 346 million. 
Table 5.1.5: Bangladeshi exports to the EU: tariffs paid and preferences received in 
thousand US$. 
 





MFN Duty (A)  Preferences received 
(B) 
Tariff costs (A-B)* 
Knitted apparel  329'135  163'086  166'048 
Not knitted RMG  206'408  26'853  179'554 
Other made up textiles  3'566  2'682  884 
Total  539'109  192'622  346'487 
Data source: Dataset and staff calculations 
 
Under  the  ceteris  paribus  assumption,  it  is  possible  to  do  a  simple  comparison 
between the costs of MFN tariffs in 2004 with the costs Bangladesh would face for 
the same volume of trade but under reduced tariffs. By taking the difference between 
tariffs  paid  after  and  before  the  reduction,  as  well  as  the  difference  between 
preferences received, one can calculate the gains from lesser tariffs and the losses 
from smaller preferences. 
Table 5.1.6: Simulation of duties to be paid under different scenarios, using 2004 
exports value, in thousand US$.  
 
Duty paid in the US  Duty paid in the EU   







MFN SF 6 
New MFN 
SF 10 
Knitted apparel  55’174  16’120  22’103  166’048  110’822  150'541 
Not knitted  113’645  40’311  53’748  179’554  68’975  94'041 
Other  4’248  1’698  2’229  884  1’208  1'641 
Total  173’067  58’129  78’080  346’486  181’006  246'224 
Data source: Dataset and staff calculations 
 
 
                                                 
145 After controlling for compliance costs, the preference margin enjoyed by Bangladesh falls to 127 
million US$.   
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The sectors presenting higher utilization rates are more exposed to the PE. But the 
overall results are positive. Bangladesh gains from tariffs reduction; the stronger the 
reduction (Swiss formula with coefficient 6), the larger are the gains. Since most of 
Bangladesh’s exports goes through the MFN channel, the reduction on duties paid due 
to reductions in tariffs goes from 195 to 280 million US$ (the Swiss formula with 
coefficient 10 and 6 respectively). Under the quotas system Bangladesh will be better 
off if tariffs are reduced.  
These results differ from Rhaman & Shadat’s (2006) essay, where Bangladesh losses 
from PE in Europe are larger than its gains in the US. The authors use different values 
for the Swiss formula’s coefficient, but the main difference consists in the preference 
margin  estimation:  They do not  take  into  account neither Bangladesh’s utilization 
rates nor the compliance costs the country faces when using the preferential access to 





VI.   Estimating Quotas Erosion: The Gravity model 
1.  Overview 
The Gravity model is a mathematical device used for the analysis of bilateral flows 
between  different  geographical  entities  in  empirical  research.  Proposed  by  Jan 
Tinbergen in 1962, this adaptation of Newton’s “Law of Universal Gravitation” has 
been applied in a whole range of international flows, such as trade, migration, tourism 
and foreign direct investment.
146 The gravity approach says that the  attractiveness 
between  two  corps  is  proportional  to  the  product  of  their  mass  and  inversely 
proportional to the distance separating them. For economics, the attractiveness refers 
to trade flows; the distance is a proxy for trade costs, while the mass, measured by the 
GDP,  can  be  seen  as  the  trading  partners  capacity  of  both  production  and 
absorption










R F =    (1) 
And its linear form is: 
ij j i ij ij D M M R F Ln q g b a + + + = ) (   (2) 
o  Fij is the “flow” (trade flow, monetary flow, migration, etc) from origin i to 
destination j; 
o  Mi and Mj are relevant economic sizes of the two locations (GDP, GDP per 
capita or population).   
o  Dij  is  the  distance  between  the  two  locations,  generally  associated  with 
transportation costs, but also time elapsed during shipment, synchronization 
costs, communication costs, transactions costs, and “cultural distance”
149. 
o  Rij represents other factors that may influence trade. 
 
                                                 
146 Head (2003), page 2. 
147 Ernst et al (2005), page 17. 
148 Head (2003), page 2. 
149 Head (2003), pages 6 and 8.  
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The  basic  explanatory  variables  of  the  gravity  equation  are  distance  and  mass
150. 
However, economic trade theory allows the inclusion of many variables  that  may 
explain  trade  flows,  like  GDP  per  capita,  corruption  measurements,  infrastructure 
facilities, exchange rate volatility, foreign direct investment, barriers to trade (such as 
tariffs, quotas, subsidies), as well as dummies for colonial history, similar language, 
whether  landlocked,  WTO  membership,  free  trade  agreements,  decent  work 
conditions, and openness to trade
151.  
In the context of preference erosion, tariffs and quota restrictiveness are the two main 
variables. They enter the gravity equation to calculate how these barriers affect trade, 
and to estimate the potential trade flows without them. 
Tinbergen’s  model  presented  good  empirical  results,  leading  many  economists  to 
study  the  microeconomic  foundations  of  the  gravity  model.  Linneman  (1966),  a 
member of Tinbergen’s team, tried to elaborate a theoretical support to the gravity 
approach by using a Heckscher-Ohlin framework and found that trade depends on 
population size differential and trade resistance
152. He was strongly criticized because 
using  a  partial  equilibrium  approach  in  an  equation  presenting  a  multiplicative 
form
153. In 1979, Anderson used a trade share expenditure system to derive the gravity 
equation
154. Bergstrand (1985, 1989) used a general equilibrium model of world trade 
to give to the gravity approach its first microeconomic basis. After that, a variety of 
theoretical and empirical studies have been done in order to derive the gravity model 
from  different  trade  models,  as  Helpman  and  Krugman  (1985),  Helpman  (1987), 
Baldwin (1994), Deardorf (1995), and Evenet and Keller (1998)
155. 
The econometric research for the correct model specification and regression method 
was also important, in particular by the inclusion of panel data techniques in gravity 
estimation. Before that, gravity models were estimated by using a year-by-year cross 
                                                 
150 Ernst et al (2005), page 18. 
151 Ibidem. 
152 Krishnakumar (2002), page 4 and 5. 
153 Rahman, M. (2003), page 4. 
154 Ibidem 
155 For a detailed overview on Gravity model foundations, see Rahman, M. (2003).  
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section  of  countries  or  by  pooling  countries  cross  section  across  time,  without 
counting for specific effects
156.  
The use of panel data techniques in the gravity relationship increases the number of 
observations and provides more accurate estimates for the regressors. Also it allows 
for  controlling  issues  such  as  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  non-spherical 
disturbances.  
Heterogeneity  across  units,  or  individual  effects,  is  an  integral  part  of  panel  data 
analysis
157. Individual effects refer to a set of individual or group specific variables 
constant over time. When all individual effects variables are observed, the model can 
be estimated by OLS. But if there is an unobserved heterogeneity across units, the 
omitted variable will lead to a biased and inconsistent least square estimator
158. In the 
absence of correlation between the excluded variable and the variables included in the 
model, the random effect approach can lead to efficient estimators. But if the included 
and excluded variables are correlated, a fixed effect approach must be preferred.  
In  general,  panel  data  sets  may  exhibit  non-spherical  disturbances,  namely 
heteroscedasticity  and  autocorrelation.  Autocorrelation  occurs  when  “the  variation 
around the regression function is not independent from one period to the next”
159. 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the error variance across individuals is not constant, 
which is much likely to occur when analyzing trade flows between different countries. 
Under non-spherical disturbances, OLS estimators are still consistent and unbiased, 
but not efficient relative to other unbiased estimators. 
Finally, there is the problem of simultaneity that occurs when some regressors are 
endogenous to the dependent variable and therefore are likely to be correlated with the 
error term. As a country cannot export more than it produces, the gravity structure 
may present endogeneity between total exports and income. Also, because quotas and 
total exports influence each other, there may be endogeneity between these variables. 
Krishnakumar  (2002)  considers  the  endogenous  variables  correlated  with  both  the 
                                                 
156 Mátyás (1998), page 3. 
157 Greene (2003), page 283. 
158  Trade  is  also  influenced  by  political,  cultural,  historical  and  geographic  factors  that  cannot  be 
readily observed, and then will be omitted. When the omitted variable is correlated with the error term, 
the estimates will be biased.  
159 Greene (2003), page 192.  
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disturbances  and  the  specific  effects  as  “doubly  endogenous”,  whereas  those 
correlated only with the specific effects as “single endogenous”
160.  
 
2.  The model 
 The gravity model to be will take the following form
161:  
yodt = a + ) ( odt X b + ) ( odt Z g + o m + t l  + ijt e   (3) 
Where
162: 
o  yodt is the clothing exports from origin country ‘o’ to destination country ‘d’, in natural 
logarithm. 
o   Xodt  includes  the  time  variant  variables
163,  namely  GDP,  and  GDP  per  capita  for 
importing  and  exporting  countries,  all  measured  in  natural  logarithms;  bilateral 
information  on  quota  restrictiveness  and  tariffs,  an  index  for  FDI  receptiveness 
(UNCTAD’s FDI inward performance index), the exchange rate between trade partners 
(as a proxy for prices), and a variable for business infrastructure (number of telephones 
lines per 100 inhabitants). 
o   Zodt includes the time invariant variables, namely dummies for common border, colonial 
links, plus the distance between the two capitals, measured in natural logarithms. 
o  o m  refers to  “individual effects”, presenting specific effects for exporting countries. 
o  t l  refers to “time effects”. 
Among the variables present in the model, the quota restrictiveness requests a more 
detailed explanation. The quota restrictiveness (QB) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when a country faces a binding quota and zero otherwise. In this 
paper, binding quota refers to a quota that is completely utilized (filled at 100 per 
                                                 
160 In the SUR-EC-AR(1) model, Krishnakumar (2002) considers that the two incomes, relative size 
factor and relative factor endowment may be “double endogenous”, while the distance between trade 
partners may be “single endogenous”. Egger (2001) uses analogous notation, by labeling exogenous 
variables  correlated  with  the  error  term  as  “single  exogenous”  and  those  uncorrelated  as  “doubly 
exogenous.  
161 In this paper, the gravity model will be estimated by using Krishnakumar’s (2002) “SUR-EC-AR(1)  
System Gravity of Trade”. Hence, from now on all equations have the same structure the author uses.  
162 See the annex to Section VI for detailed information about the variables and their sources.  
163 The gravity structure separates the time variant variables from time invariant variables as in Egger’s 
(2002) model.  
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cent). From a country’s point of view, only the binding quotas restrict trade
164. For 
countries facing binding quotas tariffs are not binding because gains from quota rents 
compensate losses from tariffs. Hence when QB is equal to one, tariffs will be zero
165. 
Since quotas are imposed at the product line level, the quota restrictiveness variable 
cannot be measured at the aggregated level, otherwise the role of quotas restriction on 
trade would be exaggerated. Hence, the gravity model will take the form of a system 
of ‘m’ equations, having the same variables as before, but measured at product line 
level.  
 
3.  The econometric framework 
The  gravity  equation  that  will  be  estimated  is  a  multivariate  system  of  equations 
where od (od = 1, …, N) refers to trade partners, t (t = 1,…, T) refers to a time period, 
and m (m = 1,…, M) corresponds to the different equations. 
yodt =  ) ( ' modt X b + ) ( ' modt Z g +  mijt e   , m= 1, …, 20   (4) 
      mijt e =  mod m + mt l  + vmijt        (5) 
vmijt =  m r  vmij,t-1 + mijt w          (6) 
It is assumed that trade residuals, vmijt, follows an AR(1) structure, with   m r < 1, and 
mijt w ~iid  (0, 
2
w s ),  and  that  the  autocorrelation  coefficient  might  differ  across 
equations. The variables are the same as before, except that exports, quotas, and tariffs 
are measured at the group level.  
It is assumed that disturbances are uncorrelated across observations, and that  mod m , 
mt l  and vmijt  are uncorrelated with themselves and with each other.  
                                                 
164 However, from the market point of view all quotas influence prices and expectations of economic 
actors, having an impact on decisions about investment and sourcing. With the quota phasing-out, a 
drop in clothing prices and a change on FDI pattern are expected.  
165 Tariffs are calculated as: (1- QB)*tariffs rates.  
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" = mk kij mij E m s m m ) (  i, j 
0 ) ( ' ' = j ki mij E m m for i ¹ i’ and/or j ¹ j’      (7) 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = = = mijt mt mijt mijt mt mijt v E v E E l m l m "i, t    (8) 
The disturbance formulation will be: 
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  = ) ( vmk N mk I W Ä w s  
And in vector notation: 
m m T N m v i I + Ä = m e ) (                 (10) 
)
~
( ) ' ( ) ' ( ) ' ( vmk N T N N mk T T N mk k m I I i i i i I E W Ä + Ä + Ä = l m s s e e             (11) 
v M T N M T N T M N T M N I I i I I i i I I i I I E W + Ä Ä S Ä Ä + Ä Ä S Ä Ä =
~
) ' ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ) ' ( l m ee  (12) 
This is an error component model with AR(1) disturbances that must be transformed 
to get rid of autocorrelation. The Krishnakumar (2002) treatment consists in using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation,  C IN Ä . For this, C must be such that C’C=  v W  
and  C v W C’=IT.  This  procedure  must  bring  the  equation  to  the  classical  error 
component  framework,  allowing  GLS  estimation
166.  Because  the  coefficient  of 
autocorrelation  differs  across  equations,  there  will  be  M  different  transformation 
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such that Cm’Cm =  vmm W , and  that Cm’ vmm W Cm = T mmI w s .  
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Hence,  
) ( ) ' ( ~ ) ' ( ~ ) ' ~ ~ ( 1 1 1 - - - Ä + Ä + Ä = T N mk T N N mk T T N mk k m I I I i i i i I E w l m s s s e e   (15) 
 
where     ) 1 )( 1 ( ~
k m mk mk r r s s m m - - = , and  ) 1 )( 1 ( ~
k m mk mk r r s s l l - - =              (16) 
 
which leads to 
) ( ) ' ( ~ ) ' ( ~ ) ~ ( 1 1 1 - - - Ä S + Ä Ä S + Ä Ä S = T N T N N T T N I I I i i i i I V w l m e    (17) 
 
The  spectral  decomposition  of  the  transformed  errors’  variance  covariance  matrix 
brings the model to the classical SUR-EC framework. The transformed model will be 
a quasi-difference model as follows
167: 
 
yodt- m r yodt-1 =  ) ( ' 1 mod, mod - - t m t X X r b  + ) ( ' 1 mod, mod - - t m t Z Z r g + 
+(1- m r ) mod m +(1- m r ) mt l + mijt w            (18)  
 
















r           (19) 
                                                 
167 In order to keep the first observations, they will be transformed by 
2 / 1 2) 1 ( r - .  
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4.  Methodology 
The gravity equation is: 
 
Expmodt =  0 a  +  QB 1 b + tariffs 2 b + ot GDP 3 b  +  dt GDP 4 b  +  ot h GDP/ 5 b  +  dt h GDP/ 6 b  +  
FDI 8 b  +  rate Exch_ 8 b  +  phone 9 b +  dist 1 g  +  contig 2 g  +  45 3col g  +  
mod m + mt l  + vmijt 
Where: 
o  QB is a dummy taking the value of one if exporting country faces a binding quota;  
o  tariffs refer the tariffs a country faces when exporting clothing, measured at HS 2 level.  
o  ot GDP  and  dt GDP  refers to natural logarithm of exporting and importing countries’ income.  
o  ot h GDP/   and  dt h GDP/ , refers to exporting and importing countries natural logarithm of 
per capita income. 
o  FDI refers to the UNCTAD’s FDI inward performance index, an index aiming to capture a 
country’s FDI “attractiveness”.  
o  rate Exch_   refers to the exchange rate between trade partners;  phone refers to number of 
phones per 100 habitants. 
o  dist  refers to the distance between importer and exporter capitals, in natural logarithm.  
o  contig  and  45 col are dummies for common borders and colonial links, respectively. 
o  mod m  refers to panel individual effects.  
o  mt l  refers to panel time effects. 
Positive  signs  are  expected  for  3 b ,  4 b ,  7 b ,  9 b ,  2 g ,  and  3 g ,  negative  signs  for 
1 b
168, 2 b ,  8 b  and  1 g , while the signs for  5 b  and  6 b  may be positive or negative.
169 
The estimation was undertaken as follows: First, the system of 20 equations with 
panel effects was regressed by instrumental within estimation (3SLS) and its residuals 
were used in order to find  m r  by using the equation (19)
170. The model was then 
                                                 
168  It  is  expected  quotas  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  trade.  But  because  quotas  are  imposed  on 
countries having high exports value, the sign of this variable may be uncertain. 
169 Rahman, M. (2003), page 16, explains the ambiguity of per capita income by economies of scale 
effect (positive sign) and absorption effects (negative sign). 
170 Rho values by group are available in the annex to Section VI.    
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transformed by  m r to the quasi-difference equation (18), which includes individual 
and time effects. Finally the transformed model was regressed by using the Baltagi’s 
EC2SLS approach. 
Only  exporting  and  importing  countries’  GDP  are  assumed  to  be  “doubly 
endogenous”,  demanding  to  be  instrumentalized.  Instruments  are  importer  and 
exporter’s openness, measured as trade to GDP ratio. Even if QB must be endogenous 
it  will  not  be  instrumentalized  because  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  appropriated 
instrument exits. 
 
5.  Data Issues 
The  dataset  consists  of  4552  observations  from  39  exporting  countries  and  15 
importing  countries,  between  1997  and  2004.  Importing  countries  are  Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Nederland, Portugal, Sweden, UK, and the US. The exporting countries are Austria, 
Belgium,  Bangladesh,  Cambodia,  Canada,  China,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, Luxembourg, 
Mauritius, the Nederland, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, 
UK, and the US. The panel is balanced. 
The data covers exports
171 of clothing (categories HTS 61, 62 and 63), number of 
binding quotas (QB), tariffs, GDP, GDP per capita, distance, FDI “attractiveness”, 
and share of phone users, plus dummies controlling for colonial links and common 
border. As suggested by Baldwin (2005) GDP and GDP per capita are measured in 
nominal terms (current US$). Detailed description of variables, their sources, as well 
as summary statistics are available on the annex to section VI. 
Some  variables  that  can  enter  gravity  equations,  such  as  indexes  for  economic 
freedom, and transparency (measuring the perceived corruption), were excluded from 
the model. This can be explained by the fact that there is no correlation between these 
                                                 
171 Because the model aims to establish the relationship between exports to restricted markets and 
quotas restrictiveness, unilateral trade flows were preferred to bilateral flows.    
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variables and total exports of clothing for the sample of countries used in the analysis. 
Actually, countries having similar export values present huge differences in the level 
of  corruption  and  economic  freedom,  providing  ambiguous  coefficients  for  these 
variables
172.  
In order to reduce the number of equations, groups of product lines were created using 
the quotas restrictiveness as criteria
173. Thus, the product lines presenting the same 
QB across countries and over time were aggregated, allowing a significant reduction 
on the number of equations, which pass from more than 1670 products lines to 52 
groups of products
174. Finally, a sample of 20 groups
175 was draw, in order to carry on 
the estimation. Table 6.5.1 shows the total number binding quotas faced by exporters 
by year. Vietnam is the most restricted country with 44 binding quotas, followed by 
China  with  40  and  Indonesia  with  31
176.  With  the  elimination  of  quotas  these 
countries may increase their market share at the expense of less restricted countries.  
Table 6.5.1: Number of binding quotas in the US and the EU, selected countries  
 
Exporter  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Bangladesh  4  3  1  1  1  2  -  - 
China  7  9  6  6  3  2  4  3 
Hong Kong  1  3  3  2  1  2  2  1 
Indonesia  7  3  4  3  8  2  2  2 
India  5  2  3  3  3  5  5  3 
Pakistan  -  -  3  2  3  2  4  5 
Philippines  4  -  5  2  -  3  3  1 
Vietnam  6  6  8  5  6  7  3  3 
Source: Dataset and staff calculation.  
                                                 
172 See the graph AS6.1 in the annex to Section VI. 
173 The creation of product groups presented some problems. The EU quota system uses the ATC 
categories, the US uses the MFA categories, and the export values are from the combined nomenclature 
(CN). The US provides a correlation between the MFA and the CN categories, but the EU does not 
provide  the  correlation  between  ATC  and  the CN.  Hence  the  author  had  to  create  the  correlation 
between the ATC categories and the CN system, convert both ATC and MFA categories to the CN to 
finally create the groups of products presenting binding quotas that are constant across countries and 
over time. 
174 There are 51 groups presenting at least one restriction, and one group representing the product lines 
without any quantitative restriction. Around 60 product lines were kept out of the sample because they 
could not be matched with the other groups. 
175 The criterion for selecting the sample’s 20 groups was the value of Bangladesh’s exports. 
176 These values refer to the 20 groups that enter the regression. If all 52 groups are taken into account, 
for the same period China has 122 binding quotas, Vietnam 87, and Indonesia 70.   
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Since groups were created in function of the number of binding quotas, they present a 
different  number  of  products  lines
177.  Also,  importing  countries  are  not  constant 
across groups.  
 
6.  Results 
The system of equations’ estimation presents the coefficients for each variable in each 
group.  In  order  to  give  an  overall  idea  of  these  results,  Table  6.6.1  presents  the 
weighed average
178 of significant coefficients for the main variables, at a 5 percent 
significance level. The complete results are presented in the annex.  
Table 6.6.1: Aggregated results, EC2SLS estimation, at 5 percent significance level   
Variables  Coefficient 
Exporter's GDP   1.8438 
Importer's GDP  0.9819 
Distance  -1.8793 
Quota Binding   -1.315 
Tariffs  -0.1564 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.4155 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.176 
Exchange rates  -0.0001 
FDI index  0.0252 
Common border  1.4935 
Colonial links  2.7597 
Constant  -40.7158 
Most of the variables present the expected sign, however there are differences across 
groups. These differences depend mainly on the characteristics of each group. Groups 
1  and  10  have  the  US  as  the  only  importer,  affecting  the  coefficients’  signs  or 
significance level for the exporter’s income, distance, tariffs and quota restrictiveness’ 
variables. On the other hand, groups 13, 18, and 19 have the EU as the only importer, 
which influences the sign of the importer’s GDP estimate
179. Finally, more than 20 
percent of the total export flows go through the quota-free group in spite of the tariffs 
                                                 
177 In the annex to Section VI the table AS6.4 presents the groups in detail, showing the share of 
imports for the US and EU, the three largest exporters and their market share in the group, as well as 
the countries having at least one binding quota during the period between 1997 and 2004. 
178 The significant coefficients for each group were weighed by the value exported by the group. 
179 In the regression, the EU enters as 14 individual countries (except Luxemburg and Belgium that 
enter jointly).   
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imposed, affecting this variable’s coefficient. The significant coefficients’ estimates 
are robust, though estimates for tariffs and importers’ GDP are more stable than those 
for exporters’ GDP and quota restrictiveness. 
The exporter’s GDP is positive and significant for all groups, except groups 1 and 10, 
where the coefficients are insignificant. Hence the low significance level of exporters’ 
GDP can be explained by the discrepancy between the US’ GDP
180 and the exporters’ 
income.  
The importing country’s GDP is also positive and significant for all groups, except 
those having only the EU as importer
181, which are negative and significant. Again, 
the difference between the US’ and European countries’ income explains the negative 
relationship between importer’s GDP and trade flows, since the country having the 
largest GDP (namely the US) does not import products from these groups. 
The distance is negative and significant for all groups with the exception of those 
having more than 90 percent of exports share going to the US, for which coefficients 
are positive or insignificant. Since the only country in the model sharing borders with 
the US (namely the Canada) accounts for only 4 percent of the US total imports, the 
distance does not work as a barrier to trade in these groups. 
The estimates for per capita income are positive for importing countries and negative 
exporting countries. WTO membership, FDI indexes, number of telephones per group 
of inhabitants, and exchange rates are not significant in most of the groups. However, 
a F-test suggests that they cannot be excluded from the model. 
The quota restrictiveness variable is positive in 2 groups, negative in 12 groups, and 
insignificant for the remainder
182. As one would expect, the two groups where quotas 
presents  positive  signs  are  groups  1  and  10.  Among  the  five  groups  presenting 
insignificant  sign  for  the  quota variable,  only two  groups,  groups  9 and  15,  have 
binding quotas in 2004. Group 15 has just one restricted country, Pakistan
  183, and 
represents only 3 percent of the total exports. Conversely, group 9 presents important 
                                                 
180 The US’ income is larger than the income of Japan, Germany, UK and France together.  
181 In the estimation, the EU imports are taken in a country-by-country basis.  
182 The quota restrictiveness variable is present in 19 of the 20 groups. It is not present in the quota free 
group. 
183 However the group 15 represents 23 percent of total Pakistani exports.  
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quota restrictions on seven countries and covers about 12 percent of the total exports 
in the regression. This group presents insignificant coefficients for both the quota 
restrictiveness  and  the  tariffs,  probably  because  these  barriers  do  not  discourage 
exporters. It is also possible that the simultaneity between quota restrictiveness and 
total exports affects the significance level of the quotas’ coefficient
184.  
Tariffs presents negative sign in most of the groups, the exception being groups 1 and 
10, where the estimates are positive. The tariffs estimates are significant in other 16 
groups,  and  insignificant  in  the  quota-free  group,  where  tariffs  do  not  seem  to 
discourage exports.   
Time effects and country effects are significant and present the expected magnitude 
with respect to the benchmark categories.  
 
7.  Sensitivity Analysis  
Countries facing binding quotas in 2004 have a potential increase in their exports 
amounting to 19.8 percent. Those are China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Vietnam. 
However this potential increase does not refer to the overall exports. Because the 
structure of the model, the impact of quota restrictiveness on each group is different, 
and the potential increase on overall trade depends on the importance of each group 
on total exports. 
The restricted countries lose 2.076 billion US$ due to quotas restrictions
185. Assuming 
the demand constant, the elimination of quotas may cause a market share’s transfer 
from  non-restricted  to  restricted  countries,  from  which  China  would  capture  21.9 
percent, Pakistan 26.6 percent, India 38 percent, Indonesia 8.2 percent and Vietnam 
5.1 percent. It represents a potential increase on total clothing exports of 7.1 percent to 
Pakistan,  6.16  to  India,  and  0.27,  0.21  and  0.15  percent  to  China,  Indonesia  and 
Vietnam respectively. Bangladesh would lose about 0.98 percent of its total apparel 
exports, amounting to 60.25 million US$. 
                                                 
184 The simultaneity between binding quotas and total exports originates from the fact that the products 
presenting binding quotas have high export values.   
185 The total value of exports in 2004 for the 20 groups and all countries included in the study amount 
to 102,9 billion US$.  
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By looking at the group level, the effects of quotas elimination in groups restricted by 
binding  quotas  in  2004  are  more  significant.  Bangladesh’s  losses  are  about  2.46 
percent, while Pakistan gains about 29 percent, India 23 percent and China 2 percent. 
Table 6.7.1 shows the gains and losses for all countries included in the model. The 
“overall” results refer to changes in the market share for the 20 groups under study, 
while the “group level” column refers to changes in the market share for the 6 groups 
presenting binding quotas in 2004. 
Table 6.7.1: Changes in the market share due to the quota elimination
186. 
Exporter  Overall  Group level     Exporter  Overall  Group level 
Pakistan  7.10%  29.00%    Italy  -0.59%  -2.01% 
India  6.16%  23.02%    Austria  -0.62%  -1.18% 
China  0.27%  1.99%    Sri Lanka  -0.63%  -1.86% 
Indonesia  0.22%  1.20%    Finland  -0.65%  -1.61% 
Vietnam  0.16%  0.89%    Germany  -0.78%  -1.94% 
Taiwan  -0.19%  -2.12%    Sweden  -0.79%  -2.06% 
South Korea  -0.23%  -2.28%    Netherlands  -0.83%  -1.98% 
Swaziland  -0.29%  -2.51%    Spain  -0.84%  -2.35% 
Australia  -0.31%  -1.62%    Denmark  -0.86%  -2.05% 
Hong Kong  -0.34%  -1.33%    USA  -0.87%  -2.65% 
Nepal  -0.36%  -2.26%    UK  -0.91%  -2.28% 
Philippines  -0.37%  -1.99%    France  -0.92%  -2.08% 
Lesotho  -0.43%  -3.32%    Belgium  -0.92%  -2.21% 
Canada  -0.46%  -2.79%    Bangladesh  -0.98%  -2.46% 
Cambodia  -0.46%  -2.28%    Lao  -1.16%  -2.25% 
South Africa  -0.49%  -2.26%    Portugal  -1.34%  -2.91% 
Luxemburg  -0.50%  -0.70%    Turkey  -1.36%  -2.73% 
Ireland  -0.58%  -1.69%    Mauritius  -1.92%  -3.51% 
Thailand  -0.58%  -1.93%    Greece  -2.18%  -2.95% 
Japan  -0.59%  -1.90%            
These results contradict most of the studies on the effects of the ATC quotas removal. 
Yang  &  Mlachila  (2005)  found  a  potential  reduction  on  Bangladesh’s  exports 
amounting to 17.7 percent, Lips et al (2003) 11.3 percent while Ernst et al (2005) 
estimates the losses to be about 20 percent.  
                                                 
186 QB is a dummy variable. The effect of the quota restrictiveness on exports is calculated as the 
exponent of QB’s estimate multiplied by the value of the exports at the group level. The transfer of 
market share is calculated within groups and the new export values are aggregated to calculate the 
overall change in the market share. Because this variable has a negative impact on trade, countries 
facing quota binding in 2004 will benefit from the quotas elimination.   
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The effect of tariffs reduction in exports is important. One percent of tariffs’ reduction 
may  increase  exports  by  0.855
187.  The  Swiss  formula  with  coefficients  6  and  10 
produces from 5 to 9 percent of tariffs’ reductions. Table 6.7.2 shows that countries 
enjoying  tariff-preferences  lose  from  tariffs  reduction.  Restricted  countries  gains 
amount  to  5.46  to  7.57  billion  US$,  while  losses  of  countries  having  preferential 
access  amount  to  8.3  to  9.3  billion  US$.  The  European  countries  lose  from  the 
increase on international competition due to lesser tariffs. 
Table 6.7.2: Gains and losses due to tariffs’ reduction, in million US$
188 
Gains and losses from tariffs’ 
reduction 
Gains and losses from tariffs’ 
reduction 
Exporter  Swiss Formula 6 Swiss Formula 10     Exporter  Swiss Formula 6 Swiss Formula 10 
China  2'075.28  2'729.16    South Africa  -7.48  -9.76 
India   676.91  939.27    Finland  -12.99  -15.78 
Vietnam  442.03  542.01    Ireland  -37.17  -42.63 
Bangladesh  422.24  661.40    Sweden  -96.52  -110.24 
Nepal  413.15  470.22    Canada  -98.75  -149.70 
Thailand  245.79  327.90    Lao  -102.18  -28.32 
Mauritius  245.15  270.57    Cambodia  -128.17  -17.71 
Pakistan  210.90  323.86    Austria  -145.00  -175.35 
Sri Lanka  126.37  147.63    Taiwan  -212.30  -90.82 
Philippines  107.06  127.05    Denmark  -242.25  -286.66 
Swaziland  101.49  164.24    Greece  -327.74  -364.87 
Hong Kong  93.84  351.43    Spain  -373.99  -435.16 
South Korea  79.65  94.46    UK  -442.81  -511.34 
Indonesia  66.69  230.96    Netherlands  -681.50  -804.39 
Luxemburg  60.59  35.48    France  -695.21  -806.76 
Japan  43.54  94.31    Portugal  -782.32  -883.44 
USA  42.89  46.06    Belgium  -870.93  -1'021.28 
Australia  14.25  16.17    Italy  -876.56  -1'052.29 
Lesotho  0.35  0.40    Turkey  -1'098.95  -1'198.75 
           Germany  -1'148.66  -1'365.91 
 
  
                                                 
187 This value refers to the aggregated value for all groups. However the effects of tariffs changes are 
calculated at group level. 
188 Tariffs are calculated as the exponent of the product of the tariffs’ estimate by the amount of tariffs 
reduction, multiplied by the value of the exports at the group level by importing country.   
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Since most of Bangladesh’s exports face MFN tariffs, the tariffs reduction will bring 
an overall positive impact on the economy. Bangladesh gains will be between 422 and 
661 million US$, depending on the formula used to simulate the reduction in tariffs. 
These gains will be reduced from 24 to 26 million US$ due to the quota removal, 
since lesser exports will reduce the gains from tariffs reduction. These results are 
larger than the one found in section five, which accounts only the gains from changes 
on duties paid. 
The  growth  of  GDP  could  compensate  Bangladesh’s  losses,  since  one  percent  of 
growth rate increase the trade potential by 1.55. However in order to increase its 
income and attract foreign investments the government must enhance reforms to raise 




VIII.  Conclusion 
 
 
T&C industry is considered as an important means for the DC industrialization in low 
value added goods, since it is labor-intensive and requires a large amount of unskilled 
workers. This sector is also important for developed countries, which protect heavily 
their apparel industries by imposing import taxes and quantitative restrictions. The 
tariffs increase domestic prices directly, while the quotas affect prices by reducing the 
quantity supplied. Both distort trade by creating a price wedge between domestic and 
international prices.  
The  ATC  quota  phasing-out  together  with  tariffs  reduction  from  the  NAMA 
negotiations may reshape the international trade in wearing apparel. The end of the 
quotas  system  may  also  affect  the  international  investment  pattern  and  sourcing 
decisions.  Under  the  MFA  the  main  factors  influencing  investment  and  sourcing 
decisions were the quota availability and its costs. With the quotas phasing-out other 
factors  will  grow  in  importance,  such  as  the  cost  and  availability  of  labor,  the 
availability  of  low  cost  raw  materials,  good  infrastructure  (roads,  ports,  reliable 
sources of energy and water), as well as the reliability, efficiency and flexibility of 
suppliers.  Increase  in  relative  competitiveness  will  depend  on  a  good  business 
environment created by political stability, and trustworthy institutions. 
The development of the RMG sector in Bangladesh is the consequence of restrictions 
in market access due to the quota regime. In 2004, it was the 9
th largest exporter of 
wearing apparel, embracing 2.2 percent of the world market. The RMG industry alone 
was responsible for about 72 percent of the total export earnings.  
Most of this success is due to abundant supply of low cost labor, and preferential 
access  to  restricted  markets.  Hence  Bangladesh  may  face  difficulty  to  adjust  to  a 
quota free world. In order to keep its export competitiveness it will have to enhance 
productivity, improve trade infrastructure, and develop its economic governance. 
Bangladesh  may  not  lose  from  preference  erosion  due  to  tariffs  reduction.  Its 
utilization rates are low, covering about 30 percent of its exports to EU. In addition, it 
does not enjoy tariff preferences in the US. Therefore, Bangladesh’s gains from tariffs  
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reduction  in  the  US  and  EU  compensate  largely  the  losses  from  reduction  in 
preference margin in the EU. The potential welfare gains to Bangladesh are between 
195 and 661 million US$, depending on the coefficient and the methodology used to 
estimate tariff reduction. These gains are not offset by the quota removal, but reduced 
from  24  to  26  million  US$,  suggesting  that  Bangladesh  gains  from  NAMA 
negotiations independently of ATC implementation. 
The quotas’ elimination will alter the relative competitiveness of various exporting 
countries. Since Bangladesh has quota free access to the EU and a large quota base in 
the US, it is expected to lose market share to more restricted competitors. The results 
from the gravity model suggest that in a quota-free environment, Bangladesh faces a 
potential decline on its total apparel exports amounting to 0.98 percent. Within the 
groups presenting binding quotas in 2004 these losses are about 2.46 percent.  
These results may underestimate the overall losses for Bangladesh and other countries 
relying heavily on markets protected by quantitative restrictions. The model does not 
account  for  many  factors  that  may  influence  the  decisions  about  sourcing  and 
investment,  such  as  infrastructure  facilities,  economic  governance  and  FDI  by 
economic  sector.  Also,  it  does  not  account  for  quotas  presenting  utilization  rates 
below 100 percent, and does not include textiles products. By relaxing the assumption 
that only the quotas filled at 100 percent are binding, the number of groups presenting 
restrictions in 2004 increases and the discrepancy between the overall results and the 
results within groups may be reduced. 
The “system gravity model of trade” suggests little change in market structure when 
compared with results from most of the studies on preference erosion, although it 
presents the advantage of eliminating the aggregation bias problem. Since this bias 
can  increase  overall  results,  it  is  also  possible  that  some  studies  overestimate  the 
changes in apparel trade pattern. However in order to compare results, this model 
must  be  expanded  to  include  textiles  and  more  trade  partners.  It  could  be  also 
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Table AS.3.1: World largest apparel exporters, in billion US$ and percentage. 
Value  Share in world exports 
Annual change, in 
percentage  Exporters    
   2004  2000  2004  2000-04  2004 
                
European Union (25)  74.92  27.0  29.0  9  9 
extra-EU (25) exports  19.13  6.9  7.4  9  11 
China    61.86  18.3  24.0  14  19 
Hong Kong, China  25.10  -  -  1  8 
domestic exports  8.14  5.0  3.2  -5  -1 
re-exports  16.96  -  -  4  13 
Turkey  11.19  3.3  4.3  14  12 
Mexico   7.20  4.4  2.8  -4  -2 
India   6.62  3.1  2.8  7  ... 
United States  5.06  4.4  2.0  -12  -9 
Romania  4.72  1.2  1.8  19  16 
Indonesia  4.45  2.4  1.7  -2  8 
Bangladesh  4.44  2.0  1.7  3  0 
Thailand   4.05  1.9  1.6  1  12 
Viet Nam  3.98  0.9  1.5  22  12 
Korea, Republic of  3.39  2.5  1.3  -9  -7 
Tunisia  3.27  1.1  1.3  10  20 
Pakistan  3.03  1.1  1.2  9  12 
Above 15  206.32  78.6  80.3  -  - 
Source: WTO 
 
Table AS.3.2: World largest apparel importers, in billion US$ and percentage. 
Value  Share in world imports 




  2004  2000  2004  2000-04  2004 
European Union (25)  121.66  39.9  45.0  10  14 
extra-EU (25) imports  65.86  20.9  24.4  11  15 
United States  75.73  32.4  28.0  3  6 
Japan  21.69  9.5  8.0  2  11 
Hong Kong, China  17.13  -  -  2  7 
retained imports  0.17  0.8  0.1  -44  -83 
Russian Federation   5.46  1.3  2.0  19  13 
Canada    5.22  1.8  1.9  9  16 
Switzerland  4.34  1.5  1.6  8  9 
Korea, Republic of  2.75  0.6  1.0  20  8 
Australia   2.67  0.9  1.0  9  22 
Mexico    2.58  1.7  1.0  -8  -15 
Singapore  2.06  0.9  0.8  2  6 
retained imports  0.56  0.3  0.2  0  12 
United Arab Emirates    2.05  0.7  0.8  ...  ... 
Norway  1.67  0.6  0.6  7  8 
China    1.54  0.6  0.6  7  8 
Saudi Arabia    1.03  0.4  0.4  ...  ... 
Above 15  250.61  93.7  93.0  -  - 














Balance of Payments 
National Accounts 
Direction of Trade 
Exports  
Imports  
                                                 




Bangladesh’s Balance of Payments, in million US$ 
 
 Item  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Current account  -436 -118 -89 -1291 -463 -418 157 176
Balance on goods  -1893 -1532 -1657 -3063 -1669 -1865 -1768 -2319
          Exports  1486 1994 2534 3884 5103 5701 5929 7521
          Imports  -3379 -3526 -4191 -6947 -6772 -7566 -7697 -9840
Services and income  -110 -21 -10 -49 -670 -708 -610 -986
          Credit  444 565 670 806 798 946 915 987
          Debit  -554 -586 -680 -855 -1468 -1654 -1525 -1973
Current transfers  1567 1435 1578 1821 1876 2394 2826 3743
          Official  768 975 1247 1475 ... ... ... ...
          Debit  799 460 331 346 ... ... ... ...
Capital account   ... 357 379 331 445 561 410 196
Financial account  ... 590 668 447 160 -116 391 78
     Direct investment  2 4 16 7 249 383 391 385
     Portfolio investment  1 6 53 -21 3 0 -6 6
     Other investments  … 580 599 461 -92 -499 6 -313
Net errors and omissions  -76 -312 -166 -504 -88 152 -550 -279
Overall balance  138 517 792 -1017 54 179 408 171
Reserves and related items  ... -517 -792 1017 -54 -179 -408 -171
     Reserve assets  … -742 -625 1062 -14 -79 -276 -235
     Use of Fund credit and loans  -139 ... -48 -121 -40 -100 -132 64
     Others  … 80 -119 76 ... ... ...  
 
 
Bangladesh’s National Accounts, at current market prices, in billion Taka. 
 
Item  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
GDP by industrial origin  1003.3 1195.4 1354.1 1663.2 2001.8 2370.9 2732.0 3329.7 3684.8
     Agriculture  295.1 339.4 334.8 409.9 490.1 583.7 599.0 672.0 708.8
     Mining  8.2 10.5 13.7 16.7 19.5 23.1 30.0 36.4 40.4
     Manufacturing  127.9 160.6 199.8 246.3 312.7 348.4 418.1 515.3 588.5
     Electricity, gas, and water  15.1 17.9 21.1 24.0 26.4 30.7 36.4 44.3 49.1
     Construction  58.2 70.6 83.2 110.0 138.6 176.2 211.6 254.0 290.4
     Trade  119.8 141.6 163.6 206.1 248.4 292.0 353.1 441.0 500.8
     Transport and 
communications  96.9 112.2 126.8 144.8 167.4 197.4 255.2 344.4 381.0
     Finance  13.4 16.4 20.1 25.2 29.9 36.5 42.1 52.0 58.3
     Public administration  20.0 25.9 33.8 40.2 49.6 62.3 71.2 86.2 98.6
     Others 
c  248.6 300.4 357.2 440.2 519.1 620.5 715.4 884.1 968.9
Net factor income from abroad  20.9 29.0 42.3 49.5 65.0 87.1 125.4 175.5 209.9




Bangladesh’s Direction of Trade, million US$ 
 
 
 Item  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Exports, total  1671 2037 2650 3297 3822 5590 5443 7586
     1. United States  510 734 886 1019 1368 1779 1504 1698
     2. Germany  108 166 228 325 404 608 566 1102
     3. United Kingdom  119 151 253 379 347 440 532 849
     4. France  62 107 155 227 254 289 311 526
     5. Italy  107 137 151 160 232 228 216 305
     6. Netherlands  38 67 101 173 189 234 208 254
     7. Belgium  … … … … 147 175 188 253
     8. Spain  7 20 35 41 47 72 104 240
     9. Canada  27 29 48 66 79 97 83 247
     10. Sweden  19 16 12 28 37 78 86 148
                  
Imports, total  3656 3731 4584 6935 7370 9001 7848 11590
     1. India  170 284 467 1018 1179 945 1146 1745
     2. China, People's Republic of  124 215 299 641 547 667 910 1446
     3. Singapore  407 222 220 313 430 761 906 873
     4. Japan  482 294 527 673 456 850 595 614
     5. Hong Kong, China  168 290 351 392 452 470 422 518
     6. Kuwait  13 8 2 7 15 29 117 639
     7. Korea, Republic of  156 214 331 368 331 348 341 419
     8. United States  186 258 214 250 242 214 234 268
     9. United Kingdom  118 132 121 170 314 239 223 283





Bangladesh’s Exports by HSC 
 
Item  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Animal and animal products  6590 10772 13551 15288 18300 17125 23222
Vegetable products  2345 2253 1622 2575 1492 1686 2356
Animal or vegetable fats  6 20 17 8 29 4 118
Prepared foodstuffs  286 133 88 370 227 745 2079
Mineral products  315 356 496 456 591 650 1539
Chemical products  569 1877 444 741 313 329 760
Plastics and rubber  9 42 25 289 639 795 988
Hides and skins  5117 6229 8624 7601 7069 12662 12770
Wood and wood products  79 150 144 174 284 271 355
Wood pulp products  107 46 36 102 181 89 95
Textiles and textile articles  56053 69688 98797 147403 178937 218746 291674
Footwear, headgear  388 1625 2601 3205 3156 4087 4069
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos  190 302 463 697 799 1110 1818
Pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, metals  3 3 0 28 0 0 99
Base metals and articles thereof  55 72 66 74 186 185 1723
Machinery and mechanical appliances  213 120 88 118 179 464 442
Transportation equipment  1 5 17 65 23 558 826
Instruments—measuring, musical  1 5 13 11 15 12 0
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  218 12 30 130 145 25 198
Works of art 
m  82 167 99 90 72 48 7
 
Bangladesh’s Imports by HSC 
 
Item  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Animal and animal products  2525 1659 2509 2889 4012 4502 4383
Vegetable products  5305 6684 27371 22299 27269 24696 47376
Animal or vegetable fats  4540 4080 7374 9915 13094 14538 28226
Prepared foodstuffs  771 1936 2455 5338 6872 9250 16681
Mineral products  16238 13249 22854 24892 36573 40889 52335
Chemical products  6293 9159 15220 20452 25939 32640 41976
Plastics and rubber  3231 4505 7593 9290 11594 14351 21629
Hides and skins  41 132 245 127 107 201 477
Wood and wood products  45 243 669 1119 1258 2151 3152
Wood pulp products  1053 2079 4549 5554 7148 8598 12334
Textiles and textile articles  26263 40321 64010 83893 89197 97449 133076
Footwear, headgear  87 216 377 364 215 187 495
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos  376 708 1189 1722 1765 2081 2678
Pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, metals  6 125 21 131 17 29 37
Base metals and articles thereof  5997 8482 13154 17769 19767 23722 28309
Machinery and mechanical appliances  8232 11065 25381 25827 34981 57970 75705
Transportation equipment  3391 5879 14256 17072 17990 24719 30974
Instruments—measuring, musical  697 811 1688 1669 2472 3011 3840
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  486 676 1362 1457 2583 3310 3796
Works of art 










Variables description and source 
Summary Statistics 
Results: Time effects and Individual effects 




Graph  AS6.1:  The  relationship  between  indexes  for  corruption, 
economic freedom and exports in wearing apparel. 
Table AS6.2: Number of product lines presenting binding quotas by 
trade partners. 
Table AS6.3: Total exports and number of product lines by groups.  
Table AS6.4: Groups in detail. 
Table  AS6.5:  Binding  quotas  by  group,  year  and  importing  and 
exporting countries. 
Table AS6.6: Rho by group 















Variable  Description and source 
Export of clothing from origin country to destination country, 





Sources:   
Europe as importing country:  
           Eurostat, at http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/,  
Exchange rate from UNSD at    
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selectionbasicFast.asp 
 
US as importing country:   
           WITS, at http://wits.worldbank.org/ 
 




Log of importing country’s GDP, current value, in US$.  Ln_GDP_d 
  Source:  
IMF,  
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/dbginim.cfm 




Source: IMF,  
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/dbginim.cfm 
Log of importing country’s GDP per capita, current value, 
US$. 
Source: IMF,  
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/dbginim.cfm 
Ln_GDP_h_d 
Source: CEPII,  
at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
Log of the distance between origin and destination countries 
capitals. 
Log_distance 





















Variable  Description and source 
Quota restrictiveness is a dummy variable, which assumes the 
value of 1 if exporting faces a binding quota, and zero otherwise. 
QB 
Source:  
US quotas at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/textiles_and_quotas/textile_status_report/ar
chived/  
EU quotas at http: 
http://sigl.cec.eu.int/choice.html 
 
Tariffs imposed by the importing country to the exporting country 
taking into account preferential agreements.  
Tariffs 
Source:  
WITS, at http://wits.worldbank.org/ 
“The Inward FDI Performance Index”, which ranks countries by 
the  FDI  they  receive  relative  to  their  economic  size.  A  value 
greater than one indicates that the country receives more FDI than 
its relative economic size, a value below one that it receives less (a 




UNCTAD at  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2472&lang=1 
Number of telephone lines for 100 habitants.  Phone 
Source:  
From 1997 to 2003, UNCTAD  
at http://www.e-stdev.org/benchmarking/ 




Dummy variable, which assumes the value of 1 if exporting and 
importing countries have common border, and zero otherwise. 
Contig 
Source:  
CEPII, at at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
Dummy variable, which assumes the value of 1 if exporting and 
importing have colonial link, and zero otherwise. 
Colony 
Source:  






















    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        year |      4552      2000.5     2.29154       1997       2004 
    ln_gdp_o |      4552     25.5945     2.17644   20.38078   30.09354 
    ln_gdp_d |      4552    26.88292    1.282456   25.12237   30.09354 
    ln_pop_o |      4552    17.03289     1.74984   12.94125   20.97429 
    ln_pop_d |      4552    16.79568    1.209991   15.11557   19.50387 
  ln_gdp_h_o |      4552    8.557789    1.800064   5.353501   11.16556 
  ln_gdp_h_d |      4552    10.08885    .3399112   9.247916   10.72933 
 ln_distance |      4552    8.323549    1.070298   5.153484   9.808717 
Exchange rate|      4552    1032.063    3178.572   .1520075   19606.16  
  FDI index  |      4072    1.391701    2.581537      -.624     19.653 
       Phone |      4447    69.79773    57.15905          0        209 
      Contig |      4552    .0544815    .2269904          0          1 








Total Exports        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min       Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 Quota freee |      4552    13.24523     5.56448          0   22.38351 
     Group 1 |      4552    .9454449    3.788529          0   19.71101 
     Group 2 |      4552    7.232185    5.994833          0   18.49929 
     Group 3 |      4552     3.25865    5.031075          0   19.64569 
     Group 4 |      4552     5.10844    5.494975          0   19.32925 
     Group 5 |      4552    11.31762    5.180176          0   19.34382 
     Group 6 |      4552     7.78729    5.752078          0   19.79855 
     Group 7 |      4552    9.277755    6.290408          0   18.84105 
     Group 8 |      4552    8.092622    5.723086          0   20.51293 
     Group 9 |      4552    12.96191    4.821387          0   20.85722 
     Group 10|      4552    .8560287    3.482189          0   19.20732 
     Group 11|      4552     10.3826    5.214284          0   18.78875 
     Group 12|      4552    13.15265    4.612384          0   20.64722 
     Group 13|      4552    10.43726    5.857644          0   20.18682 
     Group 14|      4552    12.34194     5.00449          0   19.81062 
     Group 15|      4552    9.719576    5.749335          0   20.46338 
     Group 16|      4552     11.1672    5.231065          0   20.67121 
     Group 17|      4552    4.557581    5.620974          0   20.01225 
     Group 18|      4552    10.10602    5.966634          0   18.57978 





















Quota binding        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min       Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    Group 1  |      4552           0           0          0          0 
    Group 2  |      4552    .0006591    .0256663          0          1 
    Group 3  |      4552    .0230668    .1501321          0          1 
    Group 4  |      4552    .0006591    .0256663          0          1 
    Group 5  |      4552    .0010984    .0331278          0          1 
    Group 6  |      4552    .0004394    .0209588          0          1 
    Group 7  |      4552     .034051    .1813801          0          1 
    Group 8  |      4552    .0026362    .0512819          0          1 
    Group 9  |      4552    .1783831     .382877          0          1 
    Group 10 |      4552    .0010984    .0331278          0          1 
    Group 11 |      4552    .0184534     .134599          0          1 
    Group 12 |      4552    .0707381    .2564151          0          1 
    Group 13 |      4552     .021529    .1451555          0          1 
    Group 14 |      4552    .1384007     .345358          0          1 
    Group 15 |      4552    .0006591    .0256663          0          1 
    Group 16 |      4552    .0004394    .0209588          0          1 
    Group 17 |      4552    .0010984    .0331278          0          1 
    Group 18 |      4552    .0369069    .1885538          0          1 







Tariffs             Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    Group 1  |      4544    7.257663    5.572662          0      14.83 
    Group 2  |      4544    7.172908     5.50722          0      14.33 
    Group 3  |      4544    6.908694    5.560604          0      14.33 
    Group 4  |      4544    7.221995    5.543256          0    14.6425 
    Group 5  |      4544    7.228808    5.555516          0     14.705 
    Group 6  |      4544    7.256754     5.57839          0   14.85083 
    Group 7  |      4544    6.963717    5.852054          0      17.46 
    Group 8  |      4544    7.221659    5.585538  -9.022727   14.78455 
    Group 9  |      4544    5.089738    6.066552     -12.51      17.46 
    Group 10 |      4544    7.233587    5.565613  -7.266667   14.74667 
    Group 11 |      4544    7.151318    5.818397          0      17.46 
    Group 12 |      4544    6.512013    5.897684          0      17.46 
    Group 13 |      4544    6.917145    5.551305          0      14.33 
    Group 14 |      4544    5.539482    5.635588          0      14.33 
    Group 15 |      4544     5.59922    4.999546          0       12.8 
    Group 16 |      4544    7.255381    5.576593          0    14.8402 
    Group 17 |      4544    7.365904    5.777481          0      17.46 
    Group 18 |      4544    6.735829    5.581834          0      14.33 





o  Aggregated countries effects, weighed by countries’ total exports, at 5 percent 
significance level, benchmark category: Bangladesh 
 
Country  Coefficient 
Australia  -1.585620 
Austria  -1.765280 
Belgium  -2.055880 
Cambodia  0.924902 
Canada  -1.393120 
China  -1.012650 
Denmark  1.625393 
Finland  -1.549410 
France  -1.819530 
Germany  -2.041850 
Greece  -1.470520 
Hong Kong  2.841868 
India  -1.477760 
Indonesia  -0.520200 
Ireland  -1.344410 
Italy  -1.441520 
Japan  -2.143080 
Lao  3.276962 
Lesotho  -0.230450 
Luxemburg  -2.118400 
Mauritius  2.744487 
Nepal  -1.657500 
Netherlands  -1.700330 
Pakistan  0.219516 
Philippines  -1.261120 
Portugal  2.509310 
South Africa  -1.635910 
South Korea  1.488764 
Spain  -1.521380 
Sri Lanka  1.426747 
Swaziland  0.632317 
Sweden  -1.671190 
Taiwan  -0.765110 
Thailand  1.414804 
 
o  Aggregated time effects, weighed by total exports in the year, at 5 percent 





Year  Coefficient 
1998  24.20152 
1999  24.39147 
2000  24.57210 
2001  24.26095 
2002  24.32506 
2003  23.51457  
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  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  0.882119  0.005000  0.891124  0.004000  0.951413  0.002000 
Tariffs  0.091785  0.000000  0.092287  0.000000  0.098045  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  0.030610  0.816000  0.056549  0.519000  0.009958  0.881000 
Importer's GDP  2.441275  0.000000  2.271349  0.000000  1.607380  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  0.028703  0.823000  0.006885  0.942000  0.050943  0.531000 
Importer's GDP per capita  -1.630874  0.000000  -1.445784  0.000000  -0.725189  0.000000 
Distance  3.887513  0.000000  4.215821  0.000000  5.491034  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.001050  0.790000  0.000986  0.802000  0.001030  0.792000 
Exchange rate  -0.000002  0.758000  -0.000002  0.762000  -0.000002  0.735000 
Telephone lines  -0.000979  0.518000  -0.000993  0.510000  -0.000992  0.507000 
Common border  2.855246  0.123000  3.418566  0.063000  5.616930  0.002000 













   Constant  -11.623420  0.000000 -11.214220  0.000000  -9.024859  0.000000 
                       
within  0.097400    0.1234    0.137200   
between  0.329100               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.132200               
                       












  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.571290  0.000000  -2.516397  0.000000  -2.499826  0.000000 
Tariffs  -0.263702  0.000000  -0.274423  0.000000  -0.273243  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.236236  0.000000  1.707315  0.000000  1.841278  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.757800  0.000000  1.784499  0.000000  1.668042  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -2.536633  0.000000  -2.117834  0.000000  -2.259290  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  -0.058260  0.874000  -0.038454  0.897000  0.110781  0.706000 
Distance  -1.903989  0.000000  -0.000093  0.046000  -1.785984  0.000000 
FDI inward  -0.011259  0.656000 -45.030550  0.000000  -0.005667  0.830000 
Exchange rate  -0.000096  0.032000  -0.005019  0.849000  -0.000094  0.044000 
Telephone lines  -0.008775  0.053000  -0.008195  0.084000  -0.008596  0.070000 
Common border  1.852740  0.016000  -1.902500  0.000000  2.031502  0.001000 













   Constant  -52.861480  0.000000  1.826557  0.002000 -46.343890  0.000000 
                       
within  0.167200    0.4524    0.4527   
between  0.769500               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.451900               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -0.998065  0.489000  -0.495200  0.756000  -0.017284  0.991000 
Tariffs  -0.169098  0.000000  -0.271481  0.000000  -0.238805  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.610937  0.000000  1.548934  0.000000  0.723412  0.001000 
Importer's GDP  2.056067  0.000000  2.025405  0.000000  1.625152  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.546319  0.000000  -1.653928  0.000000  -0.844900  0.004000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.597926  0.110000  1.223699  0.000000  1.713690  0.000000 
Distance  1.315506  0.000000  1.640139  0.000000  1.949615  0.000000 
FDI inward  -0.024461  0.327000  -0.020342  0.466000  -0.014050  0.612000 
Exchange rate  -0.000043  0.315000  -0.000053  0.271000  -0.000052  0.280000 
Telephone lines  -0.006231  0.097000  -0.005976  0.157000  -0.004883  0.246000 
Common border  4.404999  0.000000  4.679455  0.000000  5.301673  0.000000 













   Constant  -83.664460  0.000000 -87.241250  0.000000 -69.855180  0.000000 
                       
within  0.019300    0.3348    0.3418   
between  0.609300               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.332900               
                       










   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient   p-value 
Quota binding  0.354405  0.812000  1.476649  0.343000  2.023096  0.192000 
Tariffs  -0.174726  0.000000  -0.215454  0.000000  -0.192312  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  3.283870  0.000000  2.230557  0.000000  1.402016  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.801766  0.000000  1.803917  0.000000  1.536059  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -2.141258  0.000000  -1.316887  0.001000  -0.466228  0.192000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.979761  0.008000  1.292908  0.000000  1.618857  0.000000 
Distance  -0.130594  0.710000  -0.016005  0.948000  0.182658  0.454000 
FDI inward  -0.104824  0.000000  -0.091278  0.004000  -0.086262  0.006000 
Exchange rate  0.000080  0.111000  0.000074  0.171000  0.000077  0.155000 
Telephone lines  -0.002966  0.463000  -0.002364  0.590000  -0.000987  0.822000 
Common border  2.610972  0.000000  2.692869  0.000000  3.098661  0.000000 













   Constant  -108.552600  0.000000 -92.817690  0.000000  -75.86950  0.000000 
                       
within  0.023300    0.3896    0.3924   
between  0.700400               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.383500               
                       













   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.428195  0.000000  -2.567173  0.000000  -2.607466  0.000000 
Tariffs  -0.205195  0.000000  -0.216515  0.000000  -0.219894  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.924857  0.000000  1.757957  0.000000  1.757073  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.352526  0.000000  1.313724  0.000000  1.379278  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.753250  0.000000  -1.636980  0.000000  -1.622190  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.860205  0.007000  0.948415  0.001000  0.869111  0.001000 
Distance  -2.001325  0.000000  -1.921590  0.000000  -1.981345  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.029141  0.100000  0.030894  0.090000  0.030519  0.094000 
Exchange rate  0.000025  0.412000  0.000025  0.443000  0.000025  0.437000 
Telephone lines  -0.011113  0.005000  -0.010896  0.008000  -0.010772  0.009000 
Common border  0.286016  0.694000  0.388673  0.517000  0.274777  0.646000 













   Constant  -42.357000  0.000000 -39.978430  0.000000 -40.433510  0.000000 
                       
within  0.408500    0.5256    0.5258   
between  0.753600               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.525500               
                       










   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -1.817819  0.240000  -1.928941  0.227000  -1.838377  0.248000 
Tariffs  -0.279099  0.000000  -0.304587  0.000000  -0.298313  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.508894  0.000000  1.768148  0.000000  1.845560  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.997924  0.000000  2.016861  0.000000  1.868918  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -0.723958  0.018000  -0.973662  0.000000  -1.091422  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.555008  0.000000  1.593370  0.000000  1.776560  0.000000 
Distance  -1.027480  0.003000  -0.969445  0.001000  -0.833951  0.003000 
FDI inward  -0.012685  0.569000  -0.014746  0.523000  -0.014120  0.540000 
Exchange rate  -0.000023  0.553000  -0.000025  0.539000  -0.000026  0.517000 
Telephone lines  -0.011349  0.009000  -0.011679  0.010000  -0.012241  0.007000 
Common border  1.316384  0.074000  1.342906  0.023000  1.595708  0.007000 













   Constant  -68.506650  0.000000 -72.980880  0.000000 -73.117660  0.000000 
                       
within  0.201200    0.4662    0.4668   
between  0.783900               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.465600               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.296639  0.000000  -2.143460  0.000000  -2.292879  0.000000 
Tariffs  -0.193075  0.000000  -0.190691  0.000000  -0.199558  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.996972  0.000000  1.589485  0.000000  1.787225  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.484513  0.000000  1.446979  0.000000  1.464762  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.193589  0.000000  -0.858394  0.001000  -1.025326  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.307297  0.000000  1.353462  0.000000  1.342968  0.000000 
Distance  -2.181364  0.000000  -2.150054  0.000000  -2.136490  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.015327  0.513000  0.019752  0.416000  0.017618  0.467000 
Exchange rate  -0.000026  0.518000  -0.000026  0.539000  -0.000026  0.536000 
Telephone lines  -0.004545  0.330000  -0.003897  0.421000  -0.004123  0.395000 
Common border  0.613091  0.439000  0.674907  0.289000  0.669142  0.291000 













   Constant  -57.941890  0.000000 -51.498710  0.000000 -54.696610  0.000000 
                       
within  0.200400    0.4746    0.4746   
between  0.792200               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.474400               
                       










   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.823059  0.003000  -2.964104  0.002000  -2.533029  0.008000 
Tariffs  -0.330875  0.000000  -0.382242  0.000000  -0.361075  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.360531  0.000000  2.362364  0.000000  1.889901  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  2.150188  0.000000  2.171112  0.000000  2.010281  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -2.251503  0.000000  -2.329634  0.000000  -1.949088  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.974976  0.005000  1.101303  0.000000  1.287164  0.000000 
Distance  -0.197068  0.560000  -0.070676  0.776000  0.027520  0.911000 
FDI inward  0.048423  0.067000  0.050005  0.077000  0.055964  0.047000 
Exchange rate  -0.000025  0.581000  -0.000029  0.548000  -0.000029  0.547000 
Telephone lines  -0.004032  0.316000  -0.003889  0.367000  -0.003966  0.358000 
Common border  1.974015  0.005000  2.050857  0.000000  2.279502  0.000000 













   Constant  -86.427400  0.000000 -87.825640  0.000000 -78.468490  0.000000 
                       
                       
within  0.141100    0.4757    0.4771   
between  0.768600               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.475800               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -0.172170  0.527000  -0.231743  0.386000  -0.415426  0.118000 
Tariffs  -0.031560  0.080000  -0.037357  0.034000  -0.050842  0.004000 
Exporter's GDP  1.763852  0.000000  1.568099  0.000000  1.816733  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  0.547599  0.000000  0.520880  0.000000  0.750580  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.223398  0.000000  -1.073792  0.000000  -1.274174  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.072427  0.000000  1.099180  0.000000  0.826259  0.000000 
Distance  -2.658396  0.000000  -2.608571  0.000000  -2.804481  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.008019  0.619000  0.009904  0.549000  0.007456  0.651000 
Exchange rate  0.000030  0.287000  0.000031  0.283000  0.000032  0.273000 
Telephone lines  -0.006329  0.071000  -0.005979  0.097000  -0.006157  0.086000 
Common border  -0.197726  0.734000  -0.130387  0.795000  -0.515151  0.302000 













   Constant  -26.687780  0.000000 -23.621980  0.000000 -28.970510  0.000000 
                       
within  0.490500    0.5954    0.5973   
between  0.795900               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.596200               
                       










   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient   p-value 
Quota binding  1.230656  0.000000  0.759590  0.019000  1.038272  0.001000 
Tariffs  0.056316  0.000000  0.013475  0.320000  0.032724  0.012000 
Exporter's GDP  -0.013500  0.858000  0.152891  0.030000  0.057730  0.276000 
Importer's GDP  2.098761  0.000000  1.960652  0.000000  1.364265  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  0.097645  0.212000  -0.098686  0.230000  0.000619  0.993000 
Importer's GDP per capita  -1.103109  0.000000  0.208740  0.181000  0.917595  0.000000 
Distance  2.756828  0.000000  3.122080  0.000000  3.780286  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.007285  0.135000  0.006804  0.290000  0.007179  0.253000 
Exchange rate  0.000000  0.968000  -0.000003  0.771000  -0.000004  0.735000 
Telephone lines  -0.000355  0.809000  -0.000906  0.639000  -0.000652  0.729000 
Common border  2.008827  0.017000  2.468517  0.000000  3.668375  0.000000 













   Constant  -28.452180  0.000000  -35.381820  0.000000  -30.712120  0.000000 
                       
within  0.187900    0.3278    0.3595   
between  0.424900               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.331100               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -1.199933  0.025000  -1.193292  0.021000  -1.570411  0.002000 
Tariffs  -0.071929  0.020000  -0.082500  0.004000  -0.111212  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.870813  0.000000  1.578020  0.000000  1.829716  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  0.410270  0.000000  0.451343  0.000000  0.770503  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.470953  0.000000  -1.244344  0.000000  -1.467499  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.490705  0.000000  1.427797  0.000000  1.058101  0.000000 
Distance  -2.760203  0.000000  -2.764876  0.000000  -2.991139  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.020268  0.333000  0.023388  0.292000  0.020819  0.346000 
Exchange rate  0.000063  0.085000  0.000067  0.084000  0.000068  0.082000 
Telephone lines  -0.009685  0.013000  -0.009303  0.025000  -0.009325  0.025000 
Common border  -0.071029  0.921000  -0.112983  0.831000  -0.599487  0.256000 













   Constant  -30.452850  0.000000 -26.115990  0.000000 -32.702030  0.000000 
                       
within  0.302800    0.4844    0.4872   
between  0.723800               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.483800               
                       










   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -0.638216  0.030000  -0.749092  0.008000  -0.770124  0.006000 
Tariffs  -0.053764  0.013000  -0.062861  0.002000  -0.065061  0.001000 
Exporter's GDP  1.888457  0.000000  1.846342  0.000000  1.826513  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.136225  0.000000  1.111080  0.000000  1.194450  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.550761  0.000000  -1.530540  0.000000  -1.522991  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.894446  0.001000  0.942613  0.000000  0.840934  0.000000 
Distance  -2.179065  0.000000  -2.116440  0.000000  -2.200355  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.004708  0.732000  0.005168  0.711000  0.005495  0.693000 
Exchange rate  0.000000  0.997000  0.000000  0.990000  0.000000  0.991000 
Telephone lines  -0.006495  0.056000  -0.006446  0.061000  -0.006450  0.061000 
Common border  0.073792  0.904000  0.150768  0.785000  -0.002386  0.997000 













   Constant  -35.805680  0.000000 -35.166840  0.000000 -35.510960  0.000000 
                       
within  0.571200    0.6262    0.6264   
between  0.781700               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.626300               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.066093  0.000000  -1.171505  0.030000  -1.432794  0.007000 
Tariffs  -0.177836  0.000000  -0.125152  0.000000  -0.145780  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  1.970544  0.000000  1.580143  0.000000  1.740909  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  -0.618214  0.000000  -0.587674  0.000000  0.074072  0.270000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.739157  0.000000  -1.315278  0.000000  -1.461152  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.402364  0.311000  -0.414847  0.123000  -1.251454  0.000000 
Distance  -4.461564  0.000000  -4.653478  0.000000  -5.282031  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.031618  0.111000  0.033860  0.152000  0.032438  0.165000 
Exchange rate  -0.000030  0.389000  -0.000021  0.610000  -0.000019  0.647000 
Telephone lines  -0.006975  0.052000  -0.006395  0.136000  -0.006430  0.130000 
Common border  -1.826632  0.050000  -1.996182  0.000000  -3.137272  0.000000 













   Constant  8.128939  0.147000  20.095690  0.000000  12.656360  0.001000 
                       
within  0.319100    0.488    0.499   
between  0.625000               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.485900               
                       










   variable  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Group 14  Quota binding  -2.206761  0.000000  -1.910001  0.000000  -2.046538  0.000000 
   Tariffs  -0.188062  0.000000  -0.168184  0.000000  -0.179773  0.000000 
   Exporter's GDP  2.078327  0.000000  1.588032  0.000000  1.782065  0.000000 
   Importer's GDP  0.537423  0.000000  0.503218  0.000000  0.800273  0.000000 
   Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.783209  0.000000  -1.359589  0.000000  -1.552417  0.000000 
   Importer's GDP per capita  0.781432  0.009000  0.728421  0.006000  0.360607  0.172000 
   Distance  -2.619419  0.000000  -2.635504  0.000000  -2.924787  0.000000 
   FDI inward  0.022691  0.199000  0.026789  0.139000  0.025800  0.153000 
   Exchange rate  -0.000019  0.534000  -0.000019  0.547000  -0.000019  0.552000 
   Telephone lines  -0.014906  0.000000  -0.013905  0.001000  -0.014366  0.000000 
   Common border  -0.200817  0.766000  -0.174962  0.762000  -0.706383  0.219000 
   Colonial links  3.062246  0.000000  3.125402  0.000000  2.728820  0.000000 
   Constant  -26.355090  0.000000  -18.625070  0.000000  -23.514330  0.000000 
                       
R-squared  within  0.413700    0.5282    0.5303   
   between  0.756500               
   overall  0.528100               
                       














   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -0.315904  0.835000  -0.361315  0.813000  -0.376701  0.805000 
Tariffs  -0.087275  0.003000  -0.094035  0.001000  -0.101545  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.211296  0.000000  1.940982  0.000000  2.150200  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.455334  0.000000  1.445723  0.000000  1.414305  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.461372  0.000000  -1.246312  0.000000  -1.441173  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.393451  0.185000  0.412658  0.094000  0.456004  0.062000 
Distance  -1.394151  0.000000  -1.372645  0.000000  -1.327776  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.026719  0.202000  0.029766  0.171000  0.028119  0.195000 
Exchange rate  -0.000045  0.216000  -0.000045  0.239000  -0.000045  0.235000 
Telephone lines  -0.006289  0.097000  -0.006030  0.126000  -0.006426  0.103000 
Common border  1.687524  0.006000  1.712363  0.000000  1.776604  0.000000 













   Constant  -58.147470  0.000000 -53.833450  0.000000 -56.964520  0.000000 
                       
within  0.247400    0.5598    0.5598   
between  0.844100               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.559700               
                       










   variable  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.847385  0.065000  -2.929503  0.064000  -3.046556  0.053000 
Tariffs  -0.251457  0.000000  -0.266727  0.000000  -0.270289  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.035728  0.000000  1.967098  0.000000  2.069089  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  1.577913  0.000000  1.556981  0.000000  1.552879  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.625050  0.000000  -1.593252  0.000000  -1.685152  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.591768  0.000000  1.660855  0.000000  1.670014  0.000000 
Distance  -1.228460  0.000000  -1.159612  0.000000  -1.144562  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.038585  0.039000  0.039599  0.041000  0.038734  0.046000 
Exchange rate  0.000022  0.508000  0.000022  0.521000  0.000022  0.526000 
Telephone lines  -0.008127  0.030000  -0.008055  0.038000  -0.008216  0.034000 
Common border  0.485490  0.449000  0.560164  0.276000  0.576069  0.261000 













   Constant  -61.387290  0.000000  -60.455410  0.000000 -61.979410  0.000000 
                       
within  0.394300    0.5629    0.5629   
between  0.804400               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.562900               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  0.037845  0.975000  0.403181  0.754000  0.892974  0.485000 
Tariffs  -0.073659  0.046000  -0.072861  0.028000  -0.045650  0.158000 
Exporter's GDP  1.146349  0.001000  1.532837  0.000000  1.398144  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  2.084234  0.000000  2.107564  0.000000  1.784497  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -0.725931  0.043000  -1.041808  0.001000  -0.929503  0.001000 
Importer's GDP per capita  -0.451429  0.254000  -0.236793  0.413000  0.140885  0.622000 
Distance  0.082554  0.836000  0.063629  0.819000  0.293724  0.287000 
FDI inward  0.003023  0.904000  -0.001102  0.968000  0.000649  0.981000 
Exchange rate  -0.000013  0.770000  -0.000019  0.686000  -0.000020  0.672000 
Telephone lines  -0.006425  0.131000  -0.006795  0.144000  -0.007070  0.129000 
Common border  4.295657  0.000000  4.255674  0.000000  4.743362  0.000000 













   Constant  -58.519820  0.000000 -67.109730  0.000000 -62.193270  0.000000 
                       
within  0.081400    0.3774    0.3804   
between  0.670900               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.378100               
                       









   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -2.849539  0.000000  -1.697377  0.001000  -1.992098  0.000000 
Tariffs  -0.250177  0.000000  -0.170725  0.000000  -0.193408  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.132859  0.000000  1.466041  0.000000  1.808594  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  -0.528258  0.000000  -0.457682  0.000000  0.158272  0.035000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -2.163866  0.000000  -1.489908  0.000000  -1.820787  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  0.248856  0.548000  -0.510887  0.087000  -1.280671  0.000000 
Distance  -4.375230  0.000000  -4.676242  0.000000  -5.266693  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.010883  0.585000  0.014066  0.538000  0.011951  0.597000 
Exchange rate  -0.000040  0.249000  -0.000030  0.458000  -0.000029  0.465000 
Telephone lines  -0.006981  0.084000  -0.005979  0.197000  -0.006582  0.152000 
Common border  -1.553605  0.123000  -1.848011  0.003000  -2.929182  0.000000 













   Constant  5.496396  0.298000  19.542630  0.000000  9.907753  0.005000 
                       
within  0.313200    0.4537    0.4618   
between  0.603500               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.450400               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Quota binding  -1.470640  0.016000  -0.343090  0.560000  -0.621886  0.285000 
Tariffs  -0.168826  0.000000  -0.113747  0.004000  -0.135201  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP  2.531548  0.000000  1.728615  0.000000  2.040609  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  -0.302843  0.014000  -0.349498  0.000000  0.214333  0.002000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -1.619265  0.000000  -0.844899  0.009000  -1.078178  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.257217  0.003000  0.661160  0.019000  -0.053218  0.848000 
Distance  -4.449499  0.000000  -4.559262  0.000000  -5.075087  0.000000 
FDI inward  0.012176  0.611000  0.019238  0.493000  0.015000  0.590000 
Exchange rate  0.000005  0.905000  0.000011  0.828000  0.000014  0.781000 
Telephone lines  -0.000069  0.986000  0.000615  0.893000  0.000844  0.853000 
Common border  -1.985823  0.035000  -2.015367  0.000000  -2.962193  0.000000 













   Constant  -19.496060  0.005000  -0.562000  0.918000  -9.872961  0.031000 
                       
within  0.1495    0.4204    0.4286   
between  0.6238               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.42               
                       











   variable  Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Tariffs  -0.024955  0.423000  -0.062561  0.033000  -0.044735  0.121000 
Exporter's GDP  1.520910  0.000000  1.680597  0.000000  1.618708  0.000000 
Importer's GDP  0.755781  0.000000  0.748422  0.000000  0.277972  0.000000 
Exporter's GDP per capita  -0.998187  0.000000  -1.182731  0.000000  -1.113963  0.000000 
Importer's GDP per capita  1.744167  0.000000  1.921318  0.000000  2.489104  0.000000 
Distance  -1.509711  0.014000  -1.376448  0.000000  -0.897147  0.009000 
FDI inward  0.027651  0.034000  0.027004  0.083000  0.027289  0.078000 
Exchange rate  0.000009  0.697000  0.000007  0.789000  0.000007  0.805000 
Telephone lines  -0.008113  0.020000  -0.008600  0.039000  -0.008455  0.041000 
Common border  0.986968  0.460000  1.099291  0.134000  1.984037  0.006000 












   Constant  -31.208920  0.000000 -33.936080  0.000000 -30.013410  0.000000 
                       
within  0.614500    0.550800    0.554500   
between  0.396000               
R-squared 
  
   overall  0.550500               
                       








Graph AS6.1:Economic Feedom, Transparency and Trade 


























                                                 










Table AS6.2: Number of product lines presenting binding quotas by trade partners. 
 
 
Exporter  Importer   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Bangladesh  USA  69  41  34  29  28  56  -  - 
EU  136  190  189  172  77  63  84  46 
China  USA  35  5  5  -  -  4  -  - 
Hong Kong  EU  23  50  48  30  23  30  32  23 
EU  26  26  50  43  40  40  40  40    
Indonesia 
   USA  126  37  -  -  83  -  -  - 
EU  57  31  54  54  54  64  64  48 
India  USA  7  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Cambodia  USA  -  -  -  58  -  -  -  - 
South Korea  EU  -  -  31  40  23  40  40  38 
EU  7  -  17  17  -  -  -  - 
Sri Lanka  USA  12  55  -  -  1  -  -  - 
USA  -  -  -  -  63  -  28  82 
Pakistan  EU  -  -  48  25  17  40  48  48 
EU  23  -  23  23  -  17  -  22 
Philippines  USA  32  -  46  -  -  41  41  - 
 
Thailand  EU  23  -  40  40  17  17  40  - 
 
Turkey  USA  15  -  -  42  21  8  -  - 
 
Taiwan  EU  43  23  40  -  23  40  23  - 
EU  100  78  111  85  103  126  -  - 
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 Table AS6.4: Quota-Groups 
This table presents the groups in detail, showing the share of imports for the US and EU, the three largest exporters and their market share in the 
group, as well as the countries having at least one binding quota during the period between 1997 and 2004.  
Imports (in percent) 
 
Exporters (in percent) 
 















Hong Kong  0.1641
Bangladesh  0.122 
Group 1  1  -  South Korea  0.1137    Bangladesh, Indonesia 
China  0.3286
Hong Kong  0.0896 
Group 2  0.4849  0.5151  Sri Lanka  0.0709 China and Vietnam 
Bangladesh, Indonesia,  
Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Philippines 
Taiwan  0.1606
China  0.158 
Group 3  0.9944  0.0056  Indonesia  0.1517    Bangladesh, Indonesia,  and Cambodia 
China  0.1787
South Korea  0.1522 
Group 4  0.9661  0.0339  Taiwan  0.1007    Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka 
Turkey  0.1243
Germany  0.1027 
Group 5  0.098  0.902  India  0.0978 China, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam    
China  0.2136
India  0.1045 
Group 6  0.8001  0.1999  Hong Kong  0.0803    Bangladesh, Vietnam 
China  0.2159
Hong Kong  0.0893 


























Hong Kong  0.1872
China  0.0895 
Group 8  0.9481  0.0519  Philippines  0.0679   
Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam 
China  0.1522
Italy  0.1148 
Group 9  0.1225  0.8775  Turkey  0.0972 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, South 
Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan 
and Vietnam    
China  0.1953
Hong Kong  0.1188
Group 10  1  -  South Korea  0.1030   Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Philippines 
Turkey  0.1842
China  0.1519 
Group 11  0.0017  0.9983  Belgium  0.0875 China and Vietnam    
Turkey  0.1634
Bangladesh  0.0811 
Group 12  0.1544  0.8456  Portugal  0.0635 
China, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Pakistan, 
Taiwan and Vietnam    
China  0.2702
Germany  0.0818 
Group 13  -  1  Nederland  0.0815 China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam    
Turkey  0.1224
Germany  0.1022 
Group 14  0.0176  0.9824  Italy  0.1009 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, 
Taiwan and Vietnam    
China  0.2046
India  0.1889 
































Italy  0.1169 
Group 16  0.5505  0.4495  India  0.0925    India and Indonesia 
Hong Kong  0.2141
South Korea  0.1708 
Group 17  0.9775  0.0225  Taiwan  0.1645    India, Turkey and Vietnam 
Bangladesh  0.1594
India  0.0974 
Group 18  -  1  Hong Kong  0.0896 China, Indonesia, India, and Vietnam    
China  0.3669
Belgium  0.0931 
Group 19  -  1  Germany  0.0574 China and Vietnam    
China  0.2421
Italy  0.0894 
Quota-free  0.3558  0.6442  Germany  0.0618 
  
  
Source: Dataset and staff calculation 
 Table AS6.5: Binding quotas  
Binding quotas by group, year and importing and exporting countries. 
 
 
Importer  Exporter  Group  y1997  y1998  y1999  y2000  y2001  y2002  y2003  y2004 
USA  Bangladesh   Group 1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 2  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  China  Group 2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Sri Lanka  Group 2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Pakistan  Group 2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Philippines  Group 2  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 2  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 3  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 3  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Cambodia  Group 3  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 4  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 4  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Sri Lanka  Group 4  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  China  Group 5  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  1 
EU  Indonesia  Group 5  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  India  Group 5  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0 
EU  Sri Lanka  Group 5  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 5  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 6  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
USA   Vietnam  Group 6  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
EU  China  Group 7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 7  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0 
USA  Philippines  Group 7  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 8  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0 
USA  China  Group 8  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 8  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Cambodia  Group 8  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
USA  Pakistan  Group 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
USA  Philippines  Group 8  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0 
USA  Turkey  Group 8  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
USA   Vietnam  Group 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
EU  China  Group 9  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  Indonesia  Group 9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  India  Group 9  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  South Korea  Group 9  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  Pakistan  Group 9  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  1 
EU  Philippines  Group 9  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  1 
EU  Thailand   Group 9  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0 
EU  Taiwan  Group 9  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0 





Table AS6.5 continued 
 
Importer  Exporter  Group  y1997  y1998  y1999  y2000  y2001  y2002  y2003  y2004 
USA  Bangladesh  Group 10  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 10  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  India  Group 10  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Sri Lanka  Group 10  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Philippines  Group 10  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
EU  China  Group 11  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1 
EU  Vietnam  Group 11  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
EU  China  Group 12  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 12  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  India  Group 12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  South Korea  Group 12  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Pakistan  Group 12  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 12  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 12  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0 
EU  China  Group 13  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 13  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 13  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  China  Group 14  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
EU  Hong Kong  Group 14  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Indonesia  Group 14  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  India  Group 14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  South Korea  Group 14  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0 
EU  Sri Lanka  Group 14  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
EU  Pakistan  Group 14  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1 
EU  Philippines  Group 14  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
EU  Thailand  Group 14  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0 
EU  Taiwan  Group 14  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 14  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1 
USA  Pakistan  Group 15  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1 
USA  Indonesia  Group 16  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  India  Group 16  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
USA  Indonesia  Group 17  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
USA  Turkey  Group 17  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
USA   Vietnam  Group 17  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
EU  China  Group 18  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
EU  Indonesia  Group 18  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
EU  India  Group 18  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0 
EU  Vietnam  Group 18  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0 
EU  China  Group 19  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0 











Table AS6.6: Rho by groups 
Group  Rho    Group  Rho 
Group 1  0.975108    Group 11  0.582009 
Group 2  0.569403    Group 12  0.606987 
Group 3  0.770658    Group 13  0.782677 
Group 4  0.470586    Group 14  0.616188 
Group 5  0.485119    Group 15  0.635194 
Group 6  0.443203    Group 16  0.463786 
Group 7  0.776367    Group 17  0.521986 
Group 8  0.421425    Group 18  0.648388 
Group 9  0.669496    Group 19  0.614016 




Table AS6.7: Tariffs reduction  







     
Group  Swiss Formula 6 Swiss Formula 10 Swiss Formula 6 Swiss Formula 10 
Group 1  6.44%  5.26%  -  - 
Group 2  6.44%  5.26%  7.95%  6.50% 
Group 3  7.18%  5.94%  7.93%  6.48% 
Group 4  7.33%  6.07%  7.92%  6.48% 
Group 5  8.13%  6.80%  7.90%  6.46% 
Group 6  7.67%  6.39%  7.91%  6.47% 
Group 7  9.40%  7.96%  7.86%  6.43% 
Group 8  7.52%  6.24%  7.92%  6.47% 
Group 9  9.40%  7.96%  7.86%  6.43% 
Group 10  7.43%  6.16%  -  - 
Group 11  9.40%  7.96%  7.86%  6.43% 
Group 12  9.40%  7.96%  7.86%  6.43% 
Group 13  -  -  7.95%  6.50% 
Group 14  6.44%  5.26%  7.95%  6.50% 
Group 15  4.61%  3.61%  7.30%  5.96% 
Group 16  7.65%  6.36%  7.91%  6.47% 
Group 17  8.66%  7.29%  7.88%  6.45% 
Group 18  -  -  7.95%  6.50% 
Group 19  -  -  7.95%  6.50% 
Quota free  7.55%  6.27%  7.92%  6.47% 
 